Consider an industry with k + m duopolists. There are m cooperating duopolists who belong to a cartel. The cartel acts like a leader. Each cartel member (each cooperating duopolist) has an output of qi and cost function Ci = .591. There are k followers (fringe duopolists), each with an output yi and a cost function C; = .5yi. The duopolists have identical products and face a market demand function: p = 1- q - y =, where k y = y; and q = 9: Show the effect of an increase in the number of i=1 i=1 followers on the output of each follower. Consider an industry with k + m duopolists. There are m cooperating duopolists who belong to a cartel. The cartel acts like a leader. Each cartel member (each cooperating duopolist) has an output of qi and cost function Ci = .591. There are k followers (fringe duopolists), each with an output yi and a cost function C; = .5yi. The duopolists have identical products and face a market demand function: p = 1- q - y =, where k y = y; and q = 9: Show the effect of an increase in the number of i=1 i=1 followers on the output of each follower