Consider game Go expressed by the following payoff matrix: Go L R T 3,2 0,0 B 0,0 1,3 and games G-G4: G L R R G3 L R G4 L R T 6,4 0,0 T 4,0 1,-2 T 5,2 1,0 T 6,7 0,3 B 1,-2 2,1 B 2,0 2,3 B 0,3 2,9 B 3,0 2,6 (a) (10 points) Among G-G4, list ALL the games that are fully equivalent to Go. (b) (10 points) Among G-G4, list ALL the games that are best-response equiv- alent but not fully equivalent to Go. (c) (10 points) For games Go-G4, derive all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). G L Consider game Go expressed by the following payoff matrix: Go L R T 3,2 0,0 B 0,0 1,3 and games G-G4: G L R R G3 L R G4 L R T 6,4 0,0 T 4,0 1,-2 T 5,2 1,0 T 6,7 0,3 B 1,-2 2,1 B 2,0 2,3 B 0,3 2,9 B 3,0 2,6 (a) (10 points) Among G-G4, list ALL the games that are fully equivalent to Go. (b) (10 points) Among G-G4, list ALL the games that are best-response equiv- alent but not fully equivalent to Go. (c) (10 points) For games Go-G4, derive all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). G L