Consider the following extensive form game. 8, 1 0,0 0, 0 1, 8 6,6 1 In 5. 5 IN (1) Does this game have perfect information? Does it have perfect recall? (2 marks) 2) How many subgames does this game have in total? What are they? (2 marks) (3) Find how many pure strategies Player 1 has and label them in some meaningful way. Are any of these strategies Kuhn equivalent to each other? If so, which? (3 marks) 4) Find how many pure strategies Player 2 has and label them in some meaningful way. Are any of these strategies Kuhn equivalent to each other? If so, which? (3 marks) (5) Give the associated normal form game of this extensive form game, using just one copy of the strategies that are Kuhn equivalent to each other. (3 marks) (6) Find all the pure strategy equilibria of this associated normal form game. (3 marks) 7) Find all the subgame perfect equilibria. Remember that a subgame perfect equilibrium is a profile of behaviour strategies. You should express all of the subgame perfect equilibria as profiles of behaviour strategies, even those that involve only deterministic choices by both players. (4 marks)