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Consider the following game with three firms. First, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose quantities q1and q2respectively. After observing firm 1 and 2's quantities, firm

Consider the following game with three firms. First, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose quantities q1and q2respectively. After observing firm 1 and 2's quantities, firm 3 chooses its quantity q3. There is no production cost and the inverse demand function is p= 12(q1+q2+q3).

  1. Compute the SPNE of this game.
  2. Give an example of Nash equilibrium s with s1= 4 and s2= 6, that is not subgame perfect.

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