Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity (/1, Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 'l's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose (/3 and (13, respectively. Market demand is given by plQl = 1007 Q, and Q = q] + q; + (/3, Firm 'l's costs are ('1an l = (M1,, firm 2's costs are ("llqll = 5g; and firm 3's costs are (alt/2) = 511:, Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of ([1 and (/2, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of (11 and :11, Using these, answer the following questions. If rounding is needed, write your answers to 3 decimal places. a) (05 point) lf Firm 1 chooses (/1 = 3, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (05 point) If Firm 1 chooses (11 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? 0 c) ll point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (05 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity