Consider the following setting in which three players vote sequentially on whether or not to allow a party to be held in the neighborhood on Saturday. The party is held only with a unanimous vote. Player 1 begins by voting "yes" or "no." Player2then observes the vote of player 1 and then votes "yes" or "no". Finally, player 3 only observes the number of "yes" votes and the number of "no" votes thus far collected. With this information, player 3 votes "yes" or "no".The utilities are as follows. Player 1 likes parties and so if the party is held, he obtains 10 utils while if the party is not held, then he obtains10 utils. On the other hand, player 2 hates parties and so she obtains100utils if the party is held, while obtaining 0utils in the absence of a party. Finally, player 3 is fine with or without a party and obtains1util regardless of whether the parties held or not.

Part a: Draw the extensive form representation of this game.

Part b: Write the normal form representation of this game. You can use the payoff matrix representation to write down the normal form.