Consider the following signaling game. Player 1 has two types, ti and t2 Notice that the common prior is p(h) and p(t2)- 3,2 L 1 R 2, 3 2,0 2, 3 L t2 h 3, 1 3,2 Is s? = (L,L) a part of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game? If it is, find the corresponding PBE and write it dowm (both strategies and beliefs.) Consider the following signaling game. Player 1 has two types, ti and t2 Notice that the common prior is p(h) and p(t2)- 3,2 L 1 R 2, 3 2,0 2, 3 L t2 h 3, 1 3,2 Is s? = (L,L) a part of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game? If it is, find the corresponding PBE and write it dowm (both strategies and beliefs.)