Consider the following static game of incomplete information. Nature selects X (Player 1's type) where X=0 with probability 1/3 and X=12 with probability 2/3.Player 1 observes X but Player 2 does not. Player 2 only knows that X can be 0 or 12 and the probabilities with which Nature selects X=0 or X=12. Players I and 2 make simultaneous and independent choices and receive payoffs given by matrix below.In this game,Player 1haspossible strategies,and in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Player 1gets an expected payoff of. Please, enter numerical values only, for example: 0,1, 2,...

Consider the following static game of incomplete information. Nature selects X (Player 1's type) where X=U with probability 1!?) and X=12 with probability 21'3. Player'l observes X but Player2 does not. Player2 only knows that X can be 0 or 12 and the probabilities with which Nature selects X=U or X=12. Players | and 2 make simultaneous and independent choices and receive payos given by matrix below. In this game, Player'l has 2 possible strategies, and in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Player'l gets an expected payoff of 2 . Please, enter numerical values only, for example: 0,1, 2,... Player 1