Consider the model of political accountability by Persson et al. discussed in class, where the discount factor is 6 = 0.5, the status quo payoffs for the exec utive and legislature are $8 = 0.04 and is = 0.04 respectively, and the utility functions for both the executive and the legislature are 11(13) 2 J; in each pe riod. (1) Suppose one-playerveto checks and balances is used, namely the executive proposes (33,1) and the legislature chooses to veto or not. If the executive tries to grab as much as it can in the current period (and not being reelected after wards), how much it must offer to the legislature so that the legislature will not veto? (2) Under one-player-veto checks and balances, what is the voters' equilibrium consumption level in each period? (3) If twostage budgeting is used instead, what is the voters' equilibrium con sumption level in each period