Consider the simultaneous game of rock, paper, scissors played by two players. In this game, rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock. The winner gets 1. The loser gets -1. In case of a tie, both players get zero. Suppose you are playing with your friend. You know that he plays rock with probability 50%, scissors with probability 10%, and paper with probability 40%. In this case, he is playing a v strategy. Your best response is to play a v strategy of Now suppose you are playing a modified version of this game with my 4 year old son. He has added dynamite as an option (holding one finger in the air). Dynamite beats ea of rock, paper, and scissors. Assuming you and my son both play Nash equilibrium strategies in this modified game, then your expected payoff is rock paper scissors mixed pure -1 -0.75 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 this response. Question 14 of a Indf -7 Annotated Ribli dony