Consider the stage game below. The game is repeated once (i.c. played twice). For which value(s) of x can (U, L) be supported as part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategy of this game. P2 L C R U x, 5 1,7 2,7 P1 M 5,2 1,1 1,3 D 1,2 3,3 0,1 Consider the stage game below. The game is repeated once (i.c. played twice). For which value(s) of x can (U, L) be supported as part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategy of this game. P2 L C R U x, 5 1,7 2,7 P1 M 5,2 1,1 1,3 D 1,2 3,3 0,1