Consider the three strategies listed below: 1. Choose C in period 1, and after any history in which the other player chose C in every period except, possibly, the previous period; choose D after any other history. (That is, punishment is grim, but its initiation is delayed by one period.) 2. Choose C in period 1 and after any history in which the other player chose D in at most one period; choose D after any other history. (That is, punishment is grim, but a single lapse is forgiven.) 3. (Pavlov, or win-stun lost-shift) Choose C in period 1 and after any history in which the outcome in the last period is either (C, C) or (D, D); choose D after any other history. Consider each strategy listed: Determine the values of 6, if any, for which the strategy pair (5', s) is a Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated Prlsoner's Dilemma with discount factor 6 and the one-shot payoffs given in below. C D C 2,2 0,3 D 3,0 1,1 For each strategy 5 for which there is no value of 6 such that (s. s) is a Nash equilibrium of this game, determine whether there are any payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma such that for some 6the strategy pair (5', s) is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game with discount factor 6