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could you help me to figure out this question? The last picture shows what l've done. F410:13 4A2BAD 46% a moodle.telt.unsw.edu.au 1/2 ECON2112 Game Theory

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could you help me to figure out this question? The last picture shows what l've done.

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F410:13 4A2BAD 46% a moodle.telt.unsw.edu.au 1/2 ECON2112 Game Theory & Business Strategy Problem Set 4 March 19, 2020 1 (For parts 4 and 6, graders will be lenient as you have not yet solved many games of incom- plete information. Yet, they will expect you to try your absolute best, and provide at least a reasoning behind your answer) There are two players, A and B. Each player i E {A, B} can be of one of two types to E {1, 2}. The probability that a player is of type 2 equals 7. When A and B meet, each can decide to fight or cave. If both players fight, then player i gets payoff ti titt; - - c, ji where c > 0. If player i fights, but player j does not, then player i gets payoff 1, while player j gets payoff 0. If both players do not fight, each gets payoff 1/2.F410:13 4A2BAD 46% moodle.telt.unsw.edu.au 2/2 1.1 Draw the Bayesian normal form representation of this game. 1.2 Recall that a strategy in a static Bayesian game is a function that specifies an action for each type of a player. Write down all the possible strategies for player i. 1.3 Assume that A plays fight if tA = 2 and cave otherwise. If B is of type 2, what should she do? If she is of type 1, what should she do? 1.4 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player fights if and only if she is of type 2? If so, what is the equilibrium probability of a fight? 1.5 Assume that A never fights. If B is of type 2, what should she do? If she is of type 1, what should she do? 1.6 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which no player ever fights?T+10:11 4328AD 46% 5 T O 1.4 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player fights if and only if she is of type 2? If so, what is the equilibrium probability of a fight? player S ( 2 ) = fight for alli - A. B fight cave player fight ti MH- C , tiftinc 1 10 type > A player plays fight: A Dave III. TUL - 2+5 - C ) + (1- 71 ) - 1 type 1 A player plays fight: = 1 - STU -CTC TO ( - - C ) + CI- TV ) . 1 type 2 A player plays cane : = JT - CTU. + 1 - TV = 1 - J TV- CTV TO . 0 + ( 1 - TV ) . I = 2 - 3 TV type 1 A player plays cave : TV . Of ( 1 - TV ) . J = 3 - 3 TC. a / w ( +

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