Could you help me with the following questions I can't find the correct answers

Consider the game depicted in the table below. Player 2 Left Middle Right Up 2.6 2.5 6.8 Player 1 Middle 3.3 1.6 4,5 Down 5.5 0.2 7. 1 a) (8 points) Suppose that the stage game is repeated infinitely many times. Define a grim trigger strategy for each player. b) (17 points) Find the minimum & value that can support the strategy you wrote in part a as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Defend all your answers carefully and show every step of your calculations.Consider the stage game depicted in the table below. Player 2 Yellow Purple Player 1 Yellow (4, 4) (-1, k ) Purple (k, -1) (0,0) where k > 4. a) (6 points) Suppose that the stage game is repeated twice and players have perfect information. Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. b) (4 points) Now suppose that the stage game is repeated infinitely many times and players have perfect information. Define a grim trigger strategy for both players. c) (15 points) Suppose that both players have a discount factor of 6 = 0.8. Find the range of k values that can support the strategy profile you wrote in part (b) as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.An exchange economy consists of two individualsconsumer A and consumer B with prefer- ences over two goodsgoods X and Y. Suppose consumer A is initially endowed with 5 units of good X and 2 units of good Y and consumer B is initially endowed with 7 units of good X and 4 units of good Y. Both consumer A and consumer B have identical preferences; with the following demands: ma ma. Xe: YL= 2px ZPY mg, ml: X =~ Y: 5 2px 5 2py where m;1L denotes the value of consumer A's (initial) endowment at the competitive equilib- rium prices and mg} denotes the value of consumer B's (initial) endowment at the competitive equilibrium prices. At the resulting competitive equilibrium, what is the price of good X (with the price of good Y normalized to 1)? a) 1/3 b) 1 c) 3/5 d) 1/2 e) 2