Could you please help to solve this question with details? Thank you very much!

3. Two computer firms, A and B, plan to market network systems for office information management. Each firm can develop either a fast, high-quality system (High), or a slower, low-quality system (Low). Market research indicates that the resulting prots to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: Firm B High Lo w Firm A High 50, 40 60, 45 Low 55, 55 15, 20 (c) Suppose that both firms try to maximize profits, and Firm A has a head start in planning and can commit to the decision. Draw the game tree and find the Nash equilibrium. (cl) Firm B prefers the outcome (Low, High) to the outcome (High, Low). Can firm B credibly threat to play "High\" when firm A chooses "High"? If not, can you propose some measure that firm B can take to credibly commit himself