Court Decision 4.1 State v. James

867 So.2d 414 (Fla. App. 2004)

The State of Florida has brought this petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari seeking to quash an order of the trial court determining that the respondent/defendant, Alexander James, is entitled to utilize a "castle doctrine" defense and concomitant jury instruction at his upcoming trial for second degree murder. At issue is whether James, who was a social guest or visitor in the home of another at the time of his alleged commission of second degree murder, is entitled to the "castle doctrine" privilege and jury instruction. We conclude that he is not and for the reasons which follow, grant the petition and quash the circuit court's order under review.

Respondent James had been acquainted with a woman named Semantha Beal for approximately one week before he came to her apartment on the morning of April 17, 1997 . . . Shortly thereafter, the victim, Larry Ferguson, Beal's allegedly abusive ex-boyfriend, showed up at Beal's apartment . . . [Ferguson] grabbed Beal and began to choke her. The respondent intervened to prevent the victim from hurting her . . . During the struggle between the respondent and the victim, a gun and the victim's cellular telephone fell to the floor. The respondent picked up the gun and the victim fled into the bedroom . . . The respondent extended his right arm up in front of himself and fired a shot through the partially closed bedroom door. The bullet hit the victim in the chest at a downward angle. The victim died a few days later and the respondent was charged with second degree murder.

Both Florida statutory and common law permit the use of deadly force in self-defense if a person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Specifically, section 776.012, Florida Statutes (1995), provides that "a person . . . is justified in the use of deadly force only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony." Even under these circumstances, there is still a Florida common law duty to use every reasonable means to avoid the danger, including retreat, prior to using deadly force.

The "duty to retreat" rule has an exception, known as the "castle doctrine," which espouses that one is not required to retreat from one's residence, or one's "castle," before using deadly force in self-defense, so long as the deadly force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. Florida courts have defined the castle doctrine as a privilege one enjoys in one's own dwelling place. The Florida Supreme Court has said:

when one is violently assaulted in his own house or immediately surrounding premises, he is not obliged to retreat but may stand his ground and use such force as prudence and caution would dictate as necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm. When in his home he has "retreated to the wall." . . . [A] man is under no duty to retreat when attacked in his own home. His home is his ultimate sanctuary.

The castle doctrine privilege of non-retreat is "equally available to all those lawfully residing in the premises, provided, of course, that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm." We have further extended the "castle doctrine" privilege to employees in their place of employment, while lawfully engaged in their occupations . . .

The issue before us comes down to whether the castle doctrine privilege should be further extended to a temporary visitor or guest, since the respondent was not a resident of the apartment at the time of the alleged incident. We think that a further extension of the "castle doctrine" privilege to include a temporary social guest or visitor must be weighed against the underlying policy consideration of the "duty to retreat" rule: "[h]uman life is precious, and deadly combat should be avoided if at all possible when imminent danger to oneself can be avoided." We believe that an overly broad extension of the castle doctrine would vitiate the retreat rule. The more places there are where one has castle doctrine protection, the fewer places there would be from which one has a duty to retreat. As the state insightfully observes, granting castle doctrine protection to a social guest or visitor would necessarily grant the guest or visitor innumerable castles wherever he or she is authorized to visit. That, in turn, would expand the privilege of non-retreat and encourage the use of deadly force. We agree and, therefore, decline to extend the "castle doctrine" privilege to a temporary social guest or visitor in the home of another . . .

Petition for certiorari granted and case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Case Analysis:

Explain how and when the castle doctrine applies in Florida.

Did Mr. James have a duty to retreat?

Court Decision 4.2 Commonwealth v. Harry W. Leno, Jr., et al.

616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993)

Massachusetts is one of ten States that prohibit distribution of hypodermic needles without a prescription. In the face of those statutes the defendants operated a needle exchange program in an effort to combat the spread of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). As a result, the defendants were charged with and convicted of (1) unauthorized possession of instruments to administer controlled substances, and (2) unlawful distribution of an instrument to administer controlled substances. On appeal, the defendants challenge the judge's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. We allowed the defendants' application for direct appellate review. We affirm.

We set forth the relevant facts. In June, 1991, the defendants were arrested and charged with sixty-five counts of unauthorized possession of hypodermic needles and fifty-two counts of unauthorized possession of syringes. Each defendant also was charged with one count of distributing an instrument for the administration of a controlled substance. The defendants told the police they were exchanging clean syringes and needles for dirty, possibly contaminated, ones to prevent the spread of AIDS . . . The two defendants legally purchased new sterile needles over-the-counter in Vermont. The defendants were at a specific location on Union Street in Lynn from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. every Wednesday evening in 1991 until they were arrested June 19. They accepted dirty needles in exchange for clean needles; they exchanged between 150 and 200 needles each night, for fifty to sixty people. The defendants did not charge for the service or for the materials . . .

The defendants do not deny that they violated the provisions of the statutes restricting the possession and distribution of hypodermic needles; rather, they contend that the judge's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity was error. We disagree.

"[T]he application of the defense [of necessity] is limited to the following circumstances: (1) the defendant is faced with a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or speculative; (2) the defendant can reasonably expect that his [or her] action will be effective as the direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is [no] legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue." Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 349 (1990). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on necessity 'only if there is evidence that would warrant a reasonable doubt whether [the defendants' actions were] justified as a choice between evils. We have emphasized that a person asserting the necessity defense must demonstrate that the danger motivating his or her unlawful conduct is imminent, and that he or she acted out of necessity at all times that he or she engaged in the unlawful conduct. The analysis of whether a danger is imminent does not call for a comparison of competing harms.

The defense of justification by necessity is not applicable unless a person is "faced with a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or speculative . . ." The prevention of possible future harm does not excuse a current systematic violation of the law in anticipation of the eventual over-all benefit to the public. The defendants did not show that the danger they sought to avoid was clear and imminent, rather than debatable or speculative . . . That some States prohibit the distribution of hypodermic needles without a prescription, and others do not, merely indicates that the best course to take to address the long-term hazard of the spread of AIDS remains a matter of debate.

The defendants' argument is that, in their view, the prescription requirement for possession and distribution of hypodermic needles and syringes is both ineffective and dangerous. The Legislature, however, has determined that it wants to control the distribution of drug-related paraphernalia and their use in the consumption of illicit drugs. That public policy is entitled to deference by courts. Whether a statute is wise or effective is not within the province of courts . . . Citizens who disagree with the Legislature's determination of policy are not without remedies . . . Thus, the defendants did not meet the requirement that there be no legal alternative to abate the danger.

The defendants argue that the increasing number of AIDS cases constitutes a societal problem of great proportions, and that their actions were an effective means of reducing the magnitude of that problem; they assert that their possession, transportation and distribution of hypodermic needles eventually will produce an over-all reduction in the spread of HIV and in the future incidence of AIDS. The defendants' argument raises the issue of jury nullification, not the defense of necessity. We decline to require an instruction on jury nullification. "We recognize that jurors may return verdicts which do not comport with the judge's instructions. We do not accept the premise that jurors have a right to nullify the law on which they are instructed by the judge, or that the judge must inform them of their power.

Judgments affirmed. Case Analysis:

The defendants are alleging a right to the necessity or choice of evils defense. What are the two "evils" at issue in this case?

What was the majority's holding in the case?

Court Decision 5.2 State v. Guevara

155 Wash. App.07 (2010)

. . . Ten-year-old Esmeralda Guevara wrote a note on a stall in the girls' bathroom at a school in College Place, Washington, on the afternoon of Monday, November 5, 2007. The note read, "[B]omb set 20 mins were [sic] going to die." School administrators evacuated and closed the school to allow a bomb squad to search. The squad was unable to locate a bomb.

Late that evening, Esmeralda . . . started crying and said, "I did it. I did it." Esmeralda's mother, Zenaida Guevara, asked Esmeralda what she did. Esmeralda said she wrote the note on the bathroom stall. She told her mother she had been teased about her teeth and about being fat. Zenaida explained to Esmeralda that the matter was "really serious" and that they must call the police.

Police Officer Carol Ferraro . . . took Esmeralda to juvenile detention, where the officer took a written statement from Esmeralda. The statement read:

On Monday I was feeling very sad because there is problems at my house. Like my Dad is in Jail and my sister is at College and my grandpa is sick so I wrote Bomb threat in a pink Sharpie at 2:35 p.m. and the school was evacuated and saved. At 11:50 My mom called the police and told them I had information about the bomb threat a[sic] I told them I did it. So the police took me to J.J.C.

. . . Esmeralda contends that the court impermissibly relied exclusively on Esmeralda's after-the-fact statements to police to conclude that she had the capacity to understand the seriousness of this crime. She notes that she made the statements after her mother had told her that her actions were "really serious" and after the police came to her house close to midnight, arrested her because of the "seriousness" of her actions, and booked her into a juvenile detention facility.

. . . A statutory presumption that children between 8 and 11 years old lack capacity to commit a crime applies in juvenile proceedings. To rebut this presumption, the State must convince the trial judge that the child had sufficient capacity to understand the act and to know that it was wrong.

The court decides whether the State has rebutted the incapacity presumption by considering the following factors:

(1) the nature of the crime, (2) the child's age and maturity, (3) whether the child evidenced a desire for secrecy, (4) whether the child told the victim (if any) not to tell, (5) prior conduct similar to that charged, (6) any consequences that attached to that prior conduct, and (7) whether the child had made an acknowledgment that the behavior is wrong and could lead to detention.

. . . The juvenile court judge here considered and made appropriate findings on the seven factors outlined in Ramer:

Factor 1: The alleged crime is a Class B Felony and a serious offense. The language used threatens that people will die in a short passage of time. Considering the violent nature of our society, the recent history of violence in schools and the worldwide use by terrorists of bombs, school officials and law enforcement officers are supersensitive to threats of this nature.

Factor 2: The child, at the time of the incident, was approximately 10.5 years old. The child's appearance in court, her mother's testimony about the child and her activities and Officer Schneidmiller's testimony about his involvement with the child leads the Court to conclude Esmeralda is of at least average or above average maturity for a 10 year old . . .

Factor 3: The child did not tell anyone about her behavior that afternoon, or even early evening, when she was picked up by her mother after school was cancelled and when they returned to find the parent-teacher conferences were cancelled. She was secretive at that time.

Factor 4: There was no individual victim.

Factor 5: There is no history of prior similar conduct.

Factor 6: There were no prior consequences.

Factor 7: The child, when she told her mother later that evening, after awakening from nightmares, that she had written the threat, was at a minimum indirectly acknowledging the wrongfulness of her behavior. She also cried during the police interview.

. . . We conclude that this evidence supports the juvenile court judge's finding and that finding supports the conclusion that Esmeralda had the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of her actions . . . We affirm the conviction. Case Analysis:

What factors did the court use to determine if Esmeralda had the "capacity" to commit a crime?

What type of punishment is appropriate for Esmeralda based on her age and the crime she committed?

Answer the case analysis

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