Court Opinion 4-2 United States V. Thomas, 763 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2014)

[Chapman's] main argument is that no evidence was introduced at trial to link him, the person sitting at the defendant's table, with the "Lamar Chapman" who participated in the scheme. In this connection, he places great weight on the fact that no witness made an in-court identification of him at trial.

In essence, Chapman is arguing that identification is unique among facts required for conviction, in that (in his view) it can be established exclusively through direct, in-court testimony, and never through circumstantial evidence. That is an interesting theory, but it is not one for which we find any support in the law. Though in-court identification is preferred to prove identity, it is not required if the defendant's identity can be inferred from the circumstances. See United States v. Prieto, 549 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2008). . . .

Questions

How did the court see Chapman's son-in-law's testimony as circumstantial evidence of his identity?

What does this opinion imply about the use of circumstantial evidence to prove all crimes committed over the Internet?