CREAC, analyzing the issue below. The case included has been edited to omit material irrelevant to the promissory estoppel issue. Do not do any other research. Rely only on the edited case and the facts and question provided in the email below.

To: Intern

Fr: Department Head, Human Resources

Date: Today

Re: Threatened promissory estoppel claim

Hello. We are in the process of terminating one of the administrative assistants in our sales department, Paul Mongelli, within his probationary period. Basically, his written employment agreement says that we can terminate his employment at any time within his first ninety days at the company for no cause.

I guess this guy watches too many lawyer shows, though, because he's threatening me with something called "promissory estoppel," and he showed me an email from the head administrative assistant saying, "don't stress about this; the last four administrative assistants in your position quit because they couldn't get along with the head sales manager. If you can just get along with him, you have a job for life. I promise you." But Mongelli's contract clearly states that he can be terminated within the first ninety days for any reason or no reason. And Mongelli signed the contract and initiated that provision to show that he read and acknowledged it.

My assistant tells me that this Higginbottom case (attached) resolves this issue in our favor. Can you let me know if you agree and explain why? Assume that Mongelli can prove (1) that we made a promise, and (2) that we could have foreseen that he would rely on the promise. Focus your analysis on the justifiable reliance issue.

Thanks!

~Jody B

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND J 2 The Director of the Arizona Department of Racing is appointed by the governor pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 5-101.01(B) (1997), which provides in relevant part: "The governor shall appoint a director of the department [of racing] pursuant to $ 38-211," and "[the director serves at the pleasure of the governor **974 *141 for a term of five years." Governor J. Fife Symington III appointed Higginbottom as Director of the Department of Racing for a five-year term, beginning June 25, 1993. Higginbottom remained in the position following the expiration of his five-year term. J 3 On December 1, 1998, Governor Hull reappointed Higginbottom as director for a term beginning retroactively on June 25, 1998, and ending on June 25, 2003. Higginbottom and the Governor's representative, J. Elliot Hibbs, signed the appointment form entitled "Appointment by Governor [to] Position Having a Fixed Term" which set forth the terms of Higginbottom's appointment. See Appendix, attached hereto. According to the written agreement, Higginbottom received an initial salary of $75,000 with adjustments to be allowed for position regrades, general increases provided to all state employees, and merit-based increases. He received the same benefits provided to covered state employees, with the exception of a higher rate of annual leave accrual. J 4 When Higginbottom sought a merit-based salary increase, he was told that his appointment was for a fixed term that made him ineligible for merit-based increases.' He subsequently received a letter from State Human Resources Director James B. Matthews informing him that the Attorney General's Office had determined that pursuant to statute his position was at-will, making him eligible for merit-based increases. Matthews explained that the Director of the Department of Racing serves at the pleasure of the governor for a term of five years, and thus has an "at-will" appointment. Matthews also noted that Higginbottom's most recent appointment agreement included a provision for salary adjustments. WESTLAW @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.ll 5 Higginbottom wrote to Matthews, thanking him for nding time \"to help clarify, to others as well as myself [sic], that my position is not actually that of a person serving a xed term.\" Higginbottom continued, \"I have never been able to convince myself that 'serving at the pleasure of the Governor' meant anything but what it says.\" He also wrote that he had no doubt that his appointment agreement meant that adjustments to his salary were allowed for position regrades, general increases, and merit-based increases. 5] 6 On September 8, 2000, Governor Hull terminated Higginbottom's appointment. Higginbottom and his wife sued the State and Governor Hull for breach of contract, wrongful termination, and promissory estoppel. The defendants led a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Higginbottom's ve-year term could be terminated \"at the pleasure of the governor\" pursuant to 5101.01(B). They also asserted that the Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. 231501 and1502 (Supp.2001), prevented Higginbottom from bringing a wrongful discharge action separate and apart from his breach of contract claim. Finally, defendants argued that Higginbottom could not use the doctrine of promissory estoppel to overcome his at-will employment status because he had acknowledged in writing that he knew he served at the pleasure of the governor. ll 7 The trial court granted the defendants' motion. It found that, pursuant to 5101.01(B), Higginbottom served at the pleasure of the governor for a term not to exceed ve years but that a five-year term of employment was not guaranteed. Higginbottom and his wife timely appealed from the judgment in favor of the State and Governor Hull. ANALYSIS [discussion of breach of contract redacted] \"51 [1'] [17] [1\"] j] 18 Finally, Higginbottom argues that defendants should be estopped from denying him the benets of the contract because he relied on the contract to his detriment. To prove promissory estoppel, Higginbottom must show that the defendants made a promise and should have reasonably foreseen that he would rely on that promise; Higginbottom must also show that he actually relied on the promise to his detriment. See Contempo Constr. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. C0., 153 Ariz. 279, 282, 736 P.2d 13, 16 (App.1987). Higginbottom can only recover under the theory of promissory estoppel if he had a \"justiable right to rely\" on the alleged promise. Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 18, 470 P.2d 91, 99 (1970). \"Reliance is justied when it is reasonable, but is not justified when knowledge to the contrary exists.\" Carondelet Health Servs. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin, 187 Ariz. 467, 470, 930 P.2d 544, 547 (App.1996) (citations omitted). ll 19 The record shows that Higginbottom knew that he served at the pleasure of the governor. He wrote to the Director of the State Human Resources Division that he had \"never been able to convince [him]self that 'serving at the pleasure of the Governor' meant anything but what it says,\" and he had no quarrel with the conclusion that his position was \"not actually that of a person serving a xed term.\" Therefore, Higginbottom was not justied in believing that his appointment could not be terminated during the term specified in the appointment agreement, and he could not have reasonably relied on what he allegedly perceived as the promise of a full ve-year term. Accordingly, he cannot establish the necessary elements of promissory estoppel