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Decision Analysis - Luxury Car vs. Sportscar The next 15 questions refer to the following scenario: A car manufacturer can launch either a new luxury

Decision Analysis - Luxury Car vs. Sportscar

The next 15 questions refer to the following scenario:

A car manufacturer can launch either a new luxury sedan (L) or a new high-performance sports car (S).

The car company expects that there is a p=0.7 chance that the luxury sedan will be a hit, and a (1-p)=0.3 chance that it will be a flop.
The car company expects that there is a q=0.6 chance that the high-performance sports car will be a hit, and a (1-q) = 0.4 chance that it will be a flop.
If the luxury sedan will be a hit, the company earns $3 Million; if it is a flop, it still earns $2 Million.
If the high-performance sports car will be a hit, the company earns $6 Million; if it is a flop, it loses $2 Million.

Question 1(1 point)

Saved

How big is the expected payoff from launching the luxury sedan?

Question 1 options:

2,600,000

2,700,000

2,800,000

2,900,000

Question 2(1 point)

Saved

How big is the expected payoff from launching the high-performance sports car?

Question 2 options:

2,600,000

2,700.000

2,800,000

2,900,000

Question 3(1 point)

Saved

Measured by the expected payoffs, which statement is true? The car manufacturer

Question 3 options:

should launch the luxury sedan

should launch the high-performance sports car

is indifferent between launching the luxury sedan and the high-performance sports car.

should launch a high-performance luxury sedan without ant market study.

Question 4(1 point)

Saved

Measured by the expected payoffs and holding constant q, for what range of p is launching the luxury sedan always the best choice?

Question 4 options:

p>0.6

p>0.7

p>0.8

p>0.9

Question 5(1 point)

Saved

Measured by the expected payoffs and holding constant p, for what range of q is launching the high-performance sports car always the best choice?

Question 5 options:

q>0.5875

q>0.6125

q>0.625

q>0.65

Assume next that a risk averse manager needs to make the decision to launch either the luxury sedan or the high-performance sports car. The manager has a base salary of $100,000 plus an incentive package. The incentive package either increases or decreases the base salary, depending on the success of the new car. For every extra dollar earned with the new car, the manager's base salary increases by one cent. Likewise, for every dollar lost with the new car, the manager's base salary decreases by 1 cent. The manager's income utility function is U(Income)=sqrt(Income).

Question 6(1 point)

Saved

If the manager decides to launch the luxury sedan and it is a hit, what will be the manager's total income?

Question 6 options:

$80,000

$120,000

$130,000

$160,000

Question 7(1 point)

Saved

If the manager decides to launch the luxury sedan and it is a flop, what will be the manager's total income?

Question 7 options:

$80,000

$120,000

$130,000

$160,000

Question 8(1 point)

Saved

If the manager decides to launch the high-performance sports car and it is a hit, what will be the manager's total income?

Question 8 options:

$80,000

$120,000

$130,000

$160,000

Question 9(1 point)

Saved

If the manager decides to launch the high-performance sports care and it is a flop, what will be the manager's total income?

Question 9 options:

$80,000

$120,000

$130,000

$160,000

Question 10(1 point)

Saved

What is the manager's expected utility from launching the luxury sedan?

Question 10 options:

351.89

353.14

356.31

358.25

Question 11(1 point)

What is the manager's expected utility from launching the high-performance sports car?

Question 11 options:

351.89

353.14

356.31

358.25

Question 12(1 point)

Measured by the expected utility, which statement is true? The manager

Question 12 options:

will launch the luxury sedan

will launch the high-performance sports car

is indifferent between launching the luxury sedan and the high-performance sports car.

should launch a high-performance luxury sedan without any market study.

Question 13(1 point)

Saved

Holding constant p an q, the payoffs for the luxury sedan under each scenario, and the payoff for the high-performance sports car under the flop scenario, how big would the payoff for the high performance sports under the hit scenario have to be for the manager to choose the high-performance sports car? (Round to full numbers - zero decimals).

Question 13 options:

$2,425,856

$4,253,333

$5,425,852

$6,425,852

Question 14(1 point)

Saved

Which statement is true?

Question 14 options:

It is reasonable to assume that large companies are risk neutral and individuals risk averse.

It is reasonable to assume that individuals are risk neutral and large companies risk averse.

It is reasonable to assume that both individuals and large companies are risk neutral.

It is reasonable to assume that both individuals and large companies are risk averse.

Question 15(1 point)

Saved

Which statement describes a good decision-making process best?

Question 15 options:

Think backwards, reason backwards

Think forwards, reason forwards

Think backwards, reason forwards

Think forwards, reason backwards

Decision Analysis - Mainstream Image vs. Luxury Brand Image

The next 20 questions refer to the following scenario:

A car company is considering a campaign to change its image from a mainstream to a luxury brand. If it decides to go with a new image, the success will depend on the macroeconomic environment, which can be either booming (B), stagnating (S), or deteriorating (D).

The payoffs associated with a booming, stagnating, and deteriorating macroeconomic environment are $600, $200, and $100, respectively.
The car company evaluates the probabilities of a booming, stagnating, and deteriorating economy at p(B)=0.3, p(S)=0.5, and p(D)=0.2.
If the company decides to go with its current image, its payoff is $350, regardless of the macroeconomic environment.

Question 16(1 point)

Saved

Which statement is true?

Question 16 options:

The expected payoff from the current mainstream brand image is higher than from the new one.

Assuming risk aversion with U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff), the expected utility from the current mainstream brand image is higher than from the new one.

Both a. and b. are correct.

None of the above is correct.

Question 17(1 point)

Saved

The expected payoff from the new luxury brand image is

Question 17 options:

250

300

350

400

Question 18(1 point)

Saved

Measured by payoffs (risk neutrality), what is the expected value of perfect information?

Question 18 options:

415

420

425

430

Question 19(1 point)

Saved

Measured by payoffs (risk neutrality), what is the maximum willingness to pay for perfect information?

Question 19 options:

100

Question 20(1 point)

Measured by utility [assuming U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff)], what is the expected utility of perfect information?

Question 20 options:

20.44

24.40

26.14

29.31

Question 21(1 point)

Measured by utility [assuming U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff)], what is the expected willingness to pay for perfect information?

Question 21 options:

147.76

356.64

417.97

None of the above.

Question 22(1 point)

Which statement is true? The willingness to pay for perfect information under the assumption of risk neutrality

Question 22 options:

is smaller than under the assumption of risk aversion.

is greater than under the assumption of risk aversion.

is the same as under the assumption of risk aversion.

is indeterminate from the given information.

Assume next that the car company consults a market research company. The market research company cannot provide the car company with perfect information, but it can tell the car company whether the image campaign has a high (H) or low (L) potential. The car company then updates its expectations about the macroeconomic environment as follows:

P(High | Boom) = 1.0, P(Low | Boom) = 0.0

P(High | Stagnating) = 0.6, P(Low | Stagnating) = 0.4

P(High | Deteriorating) = 0.0, P(Low| Deteriorating) = 1.0

This means, for example, the car company thinks that if a booming state of nature reveals itself to the marketing research company, then there is an 100% chance that the marketing research company concludes "High Potential" [P(High | Boom) = 1.0].

Question 23(1 point)

Saved

After the car company updated its probabilities, what is the probability that the car company gets a verdict of high potential, p(High)

Question 23 options:

0.3

0.4

0.6

0.7

Question 24(1 point)

Saved

After the car company updated its probabilities, what is the probability that the car company gets a verdict of low potential, p(Low)

Question 24 options:

0.3

0.4

0.6

0.7

Question 25(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is booming, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(B | H)?

Question 25 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 26(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is stagnating, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(S | H)?

Question 26 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 27(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is deteriorating, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(D | H)?

Question 27 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 28(1 point)

What is the updated expected payoff of launching the new campaign if the marketing research company finds "high potential?"

Question 28 options:

375

400

425

450

Question 29(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is booming, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, p(B | L)?

Question 29 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 30(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is stagnating, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, p(S | L)?

Question 30 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 31(1 point)

Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is deteriorating, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, p(D | L)?

Question 31 options:

0.0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Question 32(1 point)

What is the updated expected payoff of launching the new campaign if the marketing research company finds "low potential?"

Question 32 options:

150

175

200

225

Question 33(1 point)

Assume that the car company is risk neutral, what is the maximum willingness to pay for the marketing research company's services?

Question 33 options:

Question 34(1 point)

Assume that the car company is risk averse, what is the maximum willingness to pay for the marketing research company's services?

Question 34 options:

20.69

26.90

29.60

60.29

Question 35(1 point)

If the marketing research company charged $25 for its services, which statement is true?

Question 35 options:

Both a risk neutral and a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company.

Only a risk neutral management would consult the marketing research company.

Only a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company.

Neither a risk neutral nor a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company.

Decision Analysis - Old vs. New Technology

The next 20 questions refer to the following scenario:

Consider a monopolist selling a product with inverse demand of P_D=12?Q. The firm currently has production costs of C(q)=5+6Q. The firm has the option of attempting to develop a new technology that would lower production costs to C(q)=5+2Q. Research and development costs are $4 if undertaken and must be incurred regardless of whether or not the new technology is "successful" or a "failure." This means that in case of failure, the firm still needs to produce with C(q)=5+6Q but incurs $4 in sunk costs. If the firm attempts to develop the new technology, the innovation will be successful with probability p=3/8. Throughout your analysis, restrict attention to the profit/loss of the firm in only the current period (i.e., assume that the firm will not be operating in any future period).

Question 36(1 point)

If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, the profit maximizing quantity is Q*=

Question 36 options:

Question 37(1 point)

If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, the profit maximizing Price is P*=

Question 37 options:

Question 38(1 point)

If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, total profit (which is the payoff when not developing the new technology) is ?*=

Question 38 options:

Question 39(1 point)

If the monopolist develops the new technology, but the technology is a failure, total profit (which is the payoff when developing, but development is failure) is ?*=

Question 39 options:

-3

-2

-1

Question 40(1 point)

If the monopolist develops the new technology and the technology is a success, total profit (which is the payoff when developing and development is a success) is ?*=

Question 40 options:

Question 41(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk neutral, what is the expected payoff from developing the new technology, EP(NT)=

Question 41 options:

1.5

2.0

4.0

6.0

Question 42(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk neutral, which statement is true?

Question 42 options:

The monopolist chooses to develop the new technology.

The monopolist chooses not to develop the new technology.

The monopolist is indifferent between developing or not developing the new technology.

From the given information, it is not possible to say whether the monopolist chooses to develop or not to develop the new technology.

Question 43(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk averse with utility function U=sqrt(Payoff), what is the expected utility from developing the new technology, EU(NT)=

Question 43 options:

1.5

2.0

4.0

6.0

Question 44(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, which statement would be true?

Question 44 options:

The monopolist chooses to develop the new technology.

The monopolist chooses not to develop the new technology.

The monopolist is indifferent between developing or not developing the new technology.

From the given information, it is not possible to say whether the monopolist chooses to develop or not to develop the new technology.

Question 45(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, what would be the expected utility of perfect information [assuming that U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff)]?

Question 45 options:

2.75

3.0

3.25

3.5

Question 46(1 point)

Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, what would be the maximum willingness to pay for perfect information?

Question 46 options:

3.0

3.25

3.56

4.0

Question 47(1 point)

Assume the monopolist could consult an engineer who, while not being able to provide perfect information, can evaluate the new technology as either "Promising" or "Risky." You then update your preferences. If P(Success)P(Promising|Success) = 0.3, what is then the updated probability of P(Risky | Success)?

Question 47 options:

1/10

2/10

3/10

4/10

Question 48(1 point)

Assume the monopolist could consult an engineer who, while not being able to provide perfect information, can evaluate the new technology as either "Promising" or "Risky." You then update your preferences. If P(Failure)P(Risky|Failure) = 0.5, what is then the updated probability of P(Promising| Failure)?

Question 48 options:

1/10

2/10

3/10

4/10

Question 49(1 point)

After updating preferences, what is the monopolist's probability of obtaining a promising result, P(Promising) =

Question 49 options:

17/40

18/40

19/40

20/40

Question 50(1 point)

After updating probabilities, what is the monopolist's probability of obtaining a risky result, P(Risky) =

Question 50 options:

21/40

22/40

23/40

24/40

Question 51(1 point)

Assume the monopolist is told by the engineer that the technology is "promising," what's the monopolist's expected payoff from pursuing the new technology?

Question 51 options:

11.29

12.19

21.91

29.11

Question 52(1 point)

Assume the monopolist is told by the engineer that the technology is "risky," what's the monopolist's expected payoff when pursuing the new technology?

Question 52 options:

0.29

0.92

2.09

20.9

Question 53(1 point)

After updating probabilities, what is the monopolist's expected payoff from the engineer's information?

Question 53 options:

5.3

6.2

7.1

8.0

Question 54(1 point)

Assuming risk-neutrality, what is the monopolist's maximum willingness to pay for the engineer's evaluation?

Question 54 options:

1.3

2.2

3.1

4.0

Question 55(1 point)

Assuming risk-aversion [U=sqrt(Payoff)], what is the monopolist's maximum willingness to pay for the engineer's evaluation?

Question 55 options:

0.65

1.65

2.65

uuesuon 11 {1 pomu What is the manager's expected utility from launching the high-performance sports car? C) 351.39 C) 353.14 C) 356.31 C) 353.25 Question 12 (1 point) Measured by the expected utility, which statement is true? The manager 0 will launch the luxury sedan Q will launch the high-performance sports car 0 is indifferent between launching the luxury sedan and the high-performance sports car. 0 should launch a high-performance luxury sedan without any market study. Question 13 (1 point) Holding constant p an q, the payoffs for the luxury sedan under each scenario, and the payoff for the high-performance sports car under the flop scenario, how big would the payoff for the high performance sports under the hit scenario have to be for the manager to choose the high-performance sports car? (Round to full numbers zero decimals). 0 $2,425,356 0 $4,253,333 0 $5,425,352 0 $6,425,352 Question 14 (1 point) Which statement is true? 0 It is reasonable to assume that large companies are risk neutral and individuals risk averse. Q It is reasonable to assume that individuals are risk neutral and large companies risk averse. 0 It is reasonable to assume that both individuals and large companies are risk neutral. 0 It is reasonable to assume that both individuals and large companies are risk averse. Question 15 (1 point) Which statement describes a good decision-making process best? 0 Think backwards, reason backwards 0 Think forwards, reason forwards 0 Think backwards, reason forwards 0 Think forwards, reason backwards Decision Analysis - Mainstream Image vs. Luxury Brand Image The next 20 questions refer to the following scenario: A car company is considering a campaign to change its image from a mainstream to a luxury brand. If it decides to create a new image, the success will depend on the macroeconomic environment, which can be either booming (B), stagnating (S), or deteriorating (D). o The payoffs associated with a booming, stagnating, and deteriorating macroeconomic environment are $600, $200, and $100, respectively. 0 The car company evaluates the probabilities of a booming, stagnating, and deteriorating economy at p(B)=0.3, p(S)=0.5, and p(D)=0.2. - If the company decides to go with its current image, its payoff is $350, regardless of the macroeconomic environment. Question 16 (1 point) Which statement is true? 0 The expected payoff from the current mainstream brand image is higher than from the new one. 0 Assuming risk aversion with U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff), the expected utility from the current mainstream brand image is higher than from the new one. 0 Both a. and b. are correct. 0 None of the above is correct. Question 17 (1 point) The expected payoff from the new luxury brand image is Question 18 (1 point) Measured by payoffs (risk neutrality), what is the expected value of perfect information? Question 19 (1 point) Measured by payoffs (risk neutrality), what is the maximum willingness to pay for perfect information? Question 20 (1 point) Measured by utility [assuming U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff)], what is the expected utility of perfect information? Question 21 (1 point) Measured by utility [assuming UlPayoff)=sqrt(Payoff)], what is the expected willingness to pay for perfect information? C) 147.76 C) 356.64 0 417.97 0 None of the above. Question 22 (1 point) Which statement is true? The willingness to pay for perfect information under the assumption of risk neutrality O is smaller than under the assumption of risk aversion. O is greater than under the assumption of risk aversion. O is the same as under the assumption of risk aversion. O is indeterminate from the given information. Assume next that the car company consults a market research company. The market research company cannot provide the car company with perfect information, but it can tell the car company whether the image campaign has a high (H) or low (L) potential. The car company then updates its expectations about the macroeconomic environment as follows: P(High | Boom) = 1.0, P(Low | Boom) = 0.0 P(High | Stagnating) = 0.6, P(Low | Stagnating) = 0.4 P(High | Deteriorating) = 0.0, P(Lowl Deteriorating) = 1.0 This means, for example, the car company thinks that if a booming state of nature reveals itself to the marketing research company, then there is an 100% chance that the marketing research company concludes "High Potential\" [P(High | Boom) = 1.0]. Question 23 (1 point) After the car company updated its probabilities, what is the probability that the car company gets a verdict of high potential, p(High) Question 24 (1 point) After the car company updated its probabilities, what is the probability that the car company gets a verdict of low potential, plLow) Question 25 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is booming, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(B | H)? Question 26 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is stagnating, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(S | H)? Question 27 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "high potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is deteriorating, given that the marketing research company finds high potential, p(D | H)? Question 28 (1 point) What is the updated expected payoff of launching the new campaign if the marketing research company finds "high potential?" Question 29 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is booming, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, p(B | L)? Question 30 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is stagnating, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, p(S | L)? Question 3 (1 point) Measured by the expected payoffs, which statement is true? The car manufacturer O should launch the luxury sedan 0 should launch the high-performance sports car O is indifferent between launching the luxury sedan and the high-performance sports car. 0 should launch a high-performance luxury sedan without ant market study. Question 4 (1 point) Measured by the expected payoffs and holding constant q, for what range of p is launching the luxury sedan always the best choice? O p>0.6 Q p>0.7 O p>0.8 O p>o.9 Question 5 (1 point) Measured by the expected payoffs and holding constant p, for what range of q is launching the high-performance sports car always the best choice? O q>0.5875 O q>0.6125 O q>0.625 O q>0.65 Question 31 (1 point) Assume the marketing research company comes back with a verdict that the outlook is "low potential." What's the car company's updated probability that the economy is deteriorating, given that the marketing research company finds low potential, plD | L)? Question 32 (1 point) What is the updated expected payoff of launching the new campaign if the marketing research company finds "low potential?" Question 33 (1 point) Assume that the car company is risk neutral, what is the maximum willingness to pay for the marketing research company's services? Question 34 (1 point) Assume that the car company is risk averse, what is the maximum willingness to pay for the marketing research company's services? Question 35 (1 point) If the marketing research company charged $25 for its services, which statement is true? 0 Both a risk neutral and a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company. 0 Only a risk neutral management would consult the marketing research company. 0 Only a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company. 0 Neither a risk neutral nor a risk averse management would consult the marketing research company. Question 36 (1 point) If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, the profit maximizing quantity is Q*= Question 37 (1 point) If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, the profit maximizing Price is P*= Question 38 (1 point) If the monopolist does not develop the new technology, total profit (which is the payoff when not developing the new technology) is n*= Question 39 (1 point) If the monopolist develops the new technology, but the technology is a failure, total profit (which is the payoff when developing, but development is failure) is n*= Question 40 (1 point) If the monopolist develops the new technology and the technology is a success, total profit (which is the payoff when developing and development is a success) is n*= Question 41 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk neutral, what is the expected payoff from developing the new technology, EP(NT)= Question 42 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk neutral, which statement is true? 0 The monopolist chooses to develop the new technology. 0 The monopolist chooses not to develop the new technology. 0 The monopolist is indifferent between developing or not developing the new technology. 0 From the given information, it is not possible to say whether the monopolist chooses to develop or not to develop the new technology. Question 43 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk averse with utility function U=sqrt(Payoff), what is the expected utility from developing the new technology, EU(NT)= Question 44 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, which statement would be true? 0 The monopolist chooses to develop the new technology. 0 The monopolist chooses not to develop the new technology. 0 The monopolist is indifferent between developing or not developing the new technology. 0 From the given information, it is not possible to say whether the monopolist chooses to develop or not to develop the new technology. Question 45 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, what would be the expected utility of perfect information [assuming that U(Payoff)=sqrt(Payoff)]? Question 46 (1 point) Assume that the monopolist is risk averse, what would be the maximum willingness to pay for perfect information? Question 47 (1 point) Assume the monopolist could consult an engineer who, while not being able to provide perfect information, can evaluate the new technology as either "Promising" or "Risky." You then update your preferences. If P(Success)xP(Promising|Success) = 0.3, what is then the updated probability of P{Risky | Success)? Question 48 (1 point) Assume the monopolist could consult an engineer who, while not being able to provide perfect information, can evaluate the new technology as either "Promising" 0r "Risky." You then update your preferences. If P(Failure)XP(Risky|Failure) = 0.5, what is then the updated probability of P(Promisingl Failure)? Question 49 (1 point) After updating preferences, what is the monopolist's probability of obtaining a promising result, P(Promising) = C) 17/40 0 13/40 0 19/40 0 20/40 Question 50 (1 point) After updating probabilities, what is the monopolist's probability of obtaining a risky result, PlRisky) = C) 21/40 0 22/40 0 23/40 O 24/40 Question 51 (1 point) Assume the monopolist is told by the engineer that the technology is "promising," what's the monopolist's expected payoff from pursuing the new technology? Question 52 (1 point) Assume the monopolist is told by the engineer that the technology is "risky," what's the monopolist's expected payoff when pursuing the new technology? Question 53 (1 point) After updating probabilities, what is the monopolist's expected payoff from the engineer's information? Assume next that a risk averse manager needs to make the decision to launch either the luxury sedan or the high-performance sports car. The manager has a base salary of $100,000 plus an incentive package. The incentive package either increases or decreases the base salary, depending on the success of the new car. For every extra dollar earned with the new car, the manager's base salary increases by one cent. Likewise, for every dollar lost with the new car, the manager's base salary decreases by 1 cent. The manager's income utility function is U(lncome)=sqrt(lncome). Question 6 (1 point) If the manager decides to launch the luxury sedan and it is a hit, what will be the manager's total income? 0 $30,000 0 $120,000 0 $130,000 0 $160,000 Question 7 (1 point) If the manager decides to launch the luxury sedan and it is a flop, what will be the manager's total income? 0 $80,000 0 $120,000 0 $130,000 O $160,000 Question 8 (1 point) If the manager decides to launch the high-performance sports car and it is a hit, what will be the manager's total income? 0 $30,000 O $120,000 0 $130,000 O $160,000 Question 9 (1 point) If the manager decides to launch the high-performance sports care and it is a flop, what will be the manager's total income? O $30,000 0 $120,000 O $130,000 O $160,000 Question 10 (1 point) What is the manager's expected utility from launching the luxury sedan? C) 351.89 O 353.14 O 356.31 O 358.25