Do Homework - Chapter 10 Homework - Google Chrome X "mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493833&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 3:14 PM (@ Homework: Chapter 10 Homework HW Score: 18.18%, 2 of 11 points O Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list n most "normal" years (years in which the market has not been disrupted by Middle East wars), at each Organization of Petroleum K Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting, Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, argu ducer, argues that the cartel should cut production. The Saudis complain that most OPEC countries (including Saudi Arabia) produce more oil than they are allotted under their cartel agreement. Use a MC graph and words to explain why cartel members would produce more than the allotted amount despite their understanding that overproduction will drive down the price of their product. Pm . . . Question 1 Assume the marginal cost (MC) and average cost (AC) of production for one of the n members of OPEC are illustrated in the figure to the right. The cartel price is Pm. at which each member is allowed to produce q- units of output to maximize cartel profits. For simplicity. O Question 2 assume a single OPEC member can increase production without substantially changing the cartel price. Using the triangle drawing fool, ilustrate the maximum amount by which the OPEC men -AC ber's profits can increase by cheating on the cartel agreement. Label this change 'Increased profits." O Question 3 Carefully follow the instructions above, and only draw the required object O Question 4 q. Units per year Question 5 O Question 6 Question 7 Question & Question 9 O Question 10 O Question 11 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Check answer Type here to search 4:31 PM ? Rain... A 01 6 6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 12 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493839&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:39 PM @ Homework: Chapter 12 Homework Question 1, Text Question 1.4 HW Score: 0%, 0 of 12 points Part 2 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Two firms face the following payoff matrix shown to the right Given these profits, Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's price? Firm 1 This is true Question 1 Does either firm have a dominant strategy? Low Price High Price Firm 1's dominant strategy is to set the low price | and Firm 2's dominant strategy |does not exist 58 O Question 2 Low Price 38 34 Question 3 Firm 2 328 High Price O Question 4 $24 O Question 5 O Question 6 Question 7 O Question & O Question 9 O Question 10 O Question 11 O Question 12 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Final check Type here to search 4:40 PM 7 660F D1 0 ( 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 13 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493840&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:59 PM @ Homework: Chapter 13 Homework Question 2, Text Question 1.4 HW Score: 7.14%, 1 of 14 points Part 3 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano's (R) and Giardino's (G). Normally, both restaurants prosper with no advertising. K Romano's could take some of Giardino's customers by running radio ads and Giardino's could do the same thing. "The one month profit matrix (showing payoffs in thousands of dollars) is shown to the right. R What is the Nash equilibrium in the static (one month) game? Question 1 X A. The Nash equilibrium is for both restaurants to not advertise No Ads Advertise O B. The Nash equilibria are for one restaurant to advertise and the other to not advertise. 6 O Question 2 O C. This game has no Nash equilibria. No Ad O D. The Nash equilibria are for both restaurants to not advertise and for both restaurants to advertise. O Question 3 #E. The Nash equilibrium is for both restaurants to advertise. G Describe one or more possible Nash equilibria if the game is repeated indefinitely. Are there multiple equilibria if the game is Advertise O Question 4 repeated indefinitely? When repeated indefinitely, O Question 5 O A. a Nash equilibrium is any set of strategies where each each restaurant won't advertise unless the other restaurant advertises, in which case the punishing restaurant will then advertise for at least 5 months. " B. a Nash equilibrium is any set of strategies where each restaurant won't advertise. O Question 6 O C. a Nash equilibrium is any set of strategies where each restaurant won't advertise unless the other restaurant advertises, in which case each restaurant will then advertise forever. O D. the game does not have a Nash e librium. O Question 7 a Nash equilibrium is any set of strategies where each restaurant won't advertise unless the other restaurant advertises, in which case the punishing restaurant will then advertise for at least 4 months. O Question 8 Would pre-play communication (cheap talk) or the Pareto criterion have implications for the repeated game equilibrium? The outcome where both restaurants do not advertise O Question 9 A. can be achieved with the Pareto Criteri rants have different understandings of the situation. O B. can be a O C. can be achieved with cheap talk by changing that outcome's payoffs O Question 10 O D. can be achieved with the Fareto vertising becomes the dominant strategy. O E. can be achieved with cheap talk or the Fareto Criterion because not advertising is credible when the game is repeated infinitely. O Question 11 O Question 12 O Question 13 O Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all ) Final check Type here to search ? 66OF 4:59 PM A D1 80 (76 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 13 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493840&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:08 PM @ Homework: Chapter 13 Homework HW Score: 17.86%, 2.5 of 14 points @ Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Derive the mixed strategy equilibrium if both Intel and AMD act simultaneously in the game in the Managerial Solution K Intel and AMD, the dominant central processing unit manufacturers, decide whether to set their advertising levels low or high. For now. suppose that they play this game once, act simultaneously, and their profits are symmetric. If both choose low levels of advertising. Intel Intel's profit, m. and AMD's profit, an, are each 2. If both choose high, each earns 3. If Intel's advertising is high and AMD's is low, x, =9 Question 1 and KA =5. If Intel's advertising is low and AMD's is high, 1 = 5 and IA =9. LOW High Let the probability that a firm chooses low be a for Intel and A for AMD. If the firms choose their advertising independently, then op is the * Question 2 probability that both choose low advertising, (1 - a)(1 - () is the probability that both choose high advertising, a(1 - P) is the probability that Intel chooses low and AMD chooses high, and (1 - a)) is the probability that Intel chooses high and AMD chooses low. LOVE X A. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to se at the low price (a = B= 1) O Question 3 AMD "B. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Intel to choose low with probability 0.222 (a = 0.222) and for AMD to choose low with 53 probability 0.222 (8 =0.222). % Question 4 O C. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the high price (a = p = 0). O D. This game has no mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. O Question 5 O E. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Intel to choose low with probability 0.778 (a =0.778) and for AMD to choose low with probability 0.778 (8 =0.778). O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 * Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 O Question 13 * Question 14 Help me solve this Grapher Ask my instructor Similar question Type here to search ? 5:08 PM 650F A D1 3 (16 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 15 Homework - Google Chrome X "mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493842&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly Homework: Chapter 15 Homework Question 1, Text Question 1.3 > HW Score: 22.44%, 2.92 of 13 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list A firm spends a great deal of money in advertising to inform consumers of the brand name of its mushrooms. Should consumers conclude that its mushrooms are likely to be of higher quality than unbranded mushrooms? Why or why not? K "XA. Yes. If the mushrooms were not of high quality, the firm would not spend a great deal of money on advertising. O B. No. Branding is often used as a me * Question 1 to thinking that a product is of superior quality when in reality it is not. AC. Yes. Branding allows the must 2. Thus. if they were of inferior quality, the company would lose customers and go out of business over time. O D. No. The fact the firm has to advertise s are of a lower quality O Question 2 O Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 * Question 6 x Question 7 % Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 % Question 13 Etext pages Grapher Ask my instructor Try again Type here to search 7:25 PM ? Rain... ~ 9 4 6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 16 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493843&questionld=3&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 7:49 PM @ Homework: Chapter 16 Homework Question 1, Text Question 1.1 HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Part 3 of 3 Points: D of 1 Save Question list If a policy change causes a Pareto improvement, is the outcome necessarily Pareto efficient? K If a policy change causes a Pareto improvement, then the outcome . is Pareto efficient because at least someone is better off. Question 1 B. is not necessarily Pareto efficient because another change could cause another Pareto improvement. O C. is not necessarily Pareto efficient because at least one person could be worse off Question 2 O D. is not Pareto efficient because it is not Pareto optimal. O E. is Pareto efficient because surplus is maximized. O Question 3 fa situation is Pareto efficient, are Pareto improvements possible? If a situation is Pareto efficient, then Pareto improvements O Question 4 X A. are possible because yone shares the extra surplus from the improvement. O) B. are not necessarily possible because th ent could leave someone no better or worse off. O Question 5 *C. are not possible e at least one person worse of O D. are not necessarily p may be better off Question 6 O) E. are possible b better off without anyone being worse off. f a change occurs that causes a Pareto efficie toome, is the change necessarily a Pareto improvement? Explain. Question 7 fa change occurs that causes a it outcome, then the change * A. is a Pareto improvement because the efit principle is satisfied. * Question & O B. is not necessarily a Pareto improvement because such improvements are value judgments. O C. is a Pareto improvement because everyone will be better off. *D. is not necessarily a Pareto improven eone could be worse off. % Question 9 O E. is a Pareto improvement because at least one person will be better off Question 10 * Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 % Question 14 Etext pages Grapher Ask my instructor Try again Type here to search 2 550F ~ D ( 10/28/2023 7:49 PMDo Homework - Chapter 17 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493844&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 8:05 PM @ Homework: Chapter 17 Homework Question 1, Text Question 1.2 HW Score: 18.18%, 2 of 11 points Part 1 of 2 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list located." Trade between North and South Korea was legalized in 1988, but it's currently very limited. Assume, however, that Hyundai hires a work force of 1,000 workers in a plant in North Korea just across the boundary with South Korea, where a "partner" plant with 1,000 workers is K Suppose that auto workers in South Korea can produce components used to make cars at the rate of 8 sets of components per worker per day and can asse mble cars at the rate of 4 cars per worker per day. In North Korea, auto workers can produce components at the rate of 1 set of components per day and can assemble cars at the rate of 3 cars per worker per day. O Question 1 One set of components is required for each car. f each plant carries out production independently without trade. then South Korea can produce a maximum of cars and North Korea can produce a maximum of cars. (Enter your responses as whole numbers) Question 2 * Question 3 * Question 4 O Question 5 Question 6 x Question 7 * Question & O Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Check answer Type here to search 8:05 PM of Tem... A D e (6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 10 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493833&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 3:27 PM @ Homework: Chapter 10 Homework Question 9, Text Question 4.2 HW Score: 15.83%, 2.5 of 16 points Part 1 of 5 Points: D of 1 Save Question list A single-price monopoly faces a demand curve of K p=90 - Q and a constant marginal (an rage) cost of m = $30. Question 1 Find the profit-maximizing quantity and price using math. Determine the profit, consumer surplus, welfare, and deadweight loss. (If necessary, round all numerical responses to two decimal places.) What is the profit-maximizing solution? Question 2 The profit-maximizing quantity is The profit-maximizing price is $ O Question 3 O Question 4 O Question 5 O Question 6 Question 7 Question & Question 9 O Question 10 O Question 11 Question 12 O Question 13 % Question 14 O Question 15 Question 16 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 3:27 PM 690F 01 3 ( 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 11 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493836&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:36 PM @ Homework: Chapter 11 Homework Question 10, Text Question 5.1 HW Score: 18.18%, 2 of 11 points Part 1 of 6 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list An incumbent firm, Firm 1, faces a potential entrant, Firm 2, with a lower marginal cost. The market demand curve is K P = 100 -91 - 92- Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $40 per unit, while Firm 2's is $10. O Question 1 What are the Cournot equilibrium price, quantities, and profits if there is no government intervention? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (q2) are O Question 2 91 =units and O Question 3 92 =[units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) O Question 4 O Question 5 O Question 6 O Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Help me solve this Grapher Ask my instructor Clear all Check answer Type here to search 7 660F 4:36 PM A D1 63 (176 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 12 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493839&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:50 PM @ Homework: Chapter 12 Homework HW Score: 22.57%, 2.71 of 12 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Charity events often use silent auctions. A donated item or event, such as a date with a movie star (Colin Firth and Scarlett Johansson in 2008) or a former president (Bill Clinton in 2013) or Warren Buffett (in 2018). is put up for bid. In a silent auction, bidders write down bids K and submit them. Some silent auctions use secret bids, which are submitted in sealed envelopes and kept confidential. Other silent auctions are open: the bidder writes down a bid on a bulletin board that everyone present can see. Which kind of suction would you expect to raise more revenue for the charity? Question 1 O A. Open bids are expected cause the winning bid will be equal to the value of the highest bidder. O B. Open bids are es r will pay an amount equal to the value of the second-highest bidder. Question 2 O C. Secre O D. Secret bids are and common values for the auction item. Question 3 O E. Secret and open bids are expected to raise the same amount of money because the bidders have private values for the auction item. Question 4 O Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 O Question & Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12 Etext pages Grapher Ask my instructor Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 66OF 4:50 PM 01 03 (16 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 13 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493840&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:06 PM @ Homework: Chapter 13 Homework HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list As the first of a new class of anti-ulcer drugs, Tagamet was extremely successful when it was introduced. However, the second entrant, K Zantac, rapidly took the lion's share of the market. Zantac works similarly to Tagamet but has fewer side effects, could be taken less a frequently when it was first introduced, and was promoted more effectively. enter The extensive-form game illustrated in the figure to the right shows the payoffs for Tagamet and Zantac entering the market, where Question 1 Tagamet moves first. Enter Suppose Zantac's profit from not entering is always zero and that Zantac's profit from entering is always positive. No entry * Question 2 Zantac will have a higher profit than Tagamet, if A. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than $1. Enter O Question 3 O B. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than 30. O C. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $0 No entry Zantac O D. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is smaller than $2 No entry % Question 4 O E. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $1. O Question 5 O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 O Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 5:06 PM ? Suns... Di e (76 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 14 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493841&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:25 PM @ Homework: Chapter 14 Homework Question 9, Text Question 5.1 HW Score: 10.61%, 1.17 of 11 points Part 3 of 3 Points: 0.67 of 1 Save Question list Assuming you are risk neutral, first answer the following two questions about your preferences Scenario A: You are given $5,000 and offered a choice between receiving an extra $2,500 with certainty or flipping a coin and getting $5,000 if heads or 90 if tails. Which option do you prefer? O Question 1 CA. Both options have identical payoffs, so I am indifferent between the two options. O B. The possibility of the $5,000 payoff is more valuable to me than the certain $2.500, I choose to flip a coin. O C. The certain $2.500 is more valuable than the uncertain $5,000, I would choose the $2.500 Question 2 Scenario B: You are given $10,000 if you will make the following choice: return $2,500 or flip a coin and return $5,000 if heads and $0 if tails. Which option do you prefer? O Question 3 *A. The possibility of the loss of $5.000 is more painful to me than the certain loss of $2,500, I would choose the $2,500 certain loss. O B. The certain loss of $2.500 is mo sible loss of $5,000. I choose to flip a coin. C. Both options have identical payoffs, so I am indifferent between the two options. O Question 4 Most people choose the sure $2,500 in the first case but flip the coin in the second. Why is this behavior is not consistent to a risk neutral person? O A. The behavior is not consistent because a risk neutral person is always able to choose the less risky option. * Question 5 B. The behavior is not consistent because the two experiments have equal payoffs O C. The behavior is not consistent be cause scenario B is riskier. % Question 6 O D. The behavior is consistent because scenario B is riskier. x Question 7 O Question & Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Etext pages Grapher Ask my instructor Try again Type here to search 5:26 PM 2 640F ~ 9 4 ( 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 16 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493843&questionld=3&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 7:59 PM @ Homework: Chapter 16 Homework HW Score: 18.18%, 2 of 11 points O Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list K labor market Outsourcing of services by American firms has contributed significantly to wage growth in India. Explain why using a graph of the Indian Assume the labor market in India is initially at an equilibrium at point e, before outsourcing from American firms. as illustrated in the figure O Question 1 to the right 1.) Using the line drawing tool, draw either a new labor demand curve or a new labor supply curve in India with outsourcing by American irms. Label the curve appropriately with 'D' or 'S" ." * Question 2 2.) Using the point drawing fool, indicate the new equilibrium wage and employment level in India with outsourcing. Label this point'ez. w, Wage Carefully follow the instructions above, and only draw the required objects. * Question 3 * Question 4 D' L, Employment in India O Question 5 Question 6 x Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 55OF 8:10 PM A D1 3 (76 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 10 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493833&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 3:28 PM @ Homework: Chapter 10 Homework Question 10, Text Question 5.3 HW Score: 15.83%, 2.5 of 18 points Part 1 of 2 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is K p = 120 - 2q. where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Question 1 Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee a can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club eam by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $|]. (Enter your response as a whole number) Question 2 O Question 3 O Question 4 O Question 5 O Question 6 Question 7 Question & O Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Question 12 O Question 13 % Question 14 O Question 15 Question 16 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 3:28 PM f Nea.. A D e (6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 11 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493836&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:36 PM @ Homework: Chapter 11 Homework HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list As the first of a new class of anti-ulcer drugs, Tagamet was extremely successful when it was introduced. However, the second entrant, K Zantac, rapidly took the lion's share of the market. Zantac works similarly to Tagamet but has fewer side effects, could be taken less a frequently when it was first introduced, and was promoted more effectively. enter The extensive-form game illustrated in the figure to the right shows the payoffs for Tagamet and Zantac entering the market, where Question 1 Tagamet moves first. Enter Suppose Zantac's profit from not entering is always zero and that Zantac's profit from entering is always positive. No entry * Question 2 Zantac will have a higher profit than Tagamet, if A. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than $1. Enter O Question 3 O B. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than 30. O C. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $0 No entry Zantac O D. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is smaller than $2 No entry % Question 4 O E. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $1. O Question 5 O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 O Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 5:06 PM ? Suns... Di e (76 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 14 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493841&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:26 PM @ Homework: Chapter 14 Homework Question 10, Text Question 5.2 HW Score: 10.81%, 1.17 of 11 points Part 1 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Evan is risk-seeking with respect to gains and risk-averse with respect to losses. Louise is risk-seeking with respect to losses K and risk-averse with respect to gains. Illustrate both utility functions. Which person's attitudes toward risk are consistent with prospect theory? Which of these people would you expect to be susceptible to framing effects? 1.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Evan's utility function for gains. Label this curve "Gainsevan." O Question 1 2.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Evan's utility function for losses. Label this curve 'LossesEvan." Question 2 B.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Louiss's utility function for gains. Label this curve 'GainsLouisa 1.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Louiss's utility function for losses. Label this curve 'LossesLouisa. i- Losses Gains O Question 3 Carefully follow the instructions above, and only draw the required objects. O Question 4 Outcome * Question 5 % Question 6 Question 7 O Question & % Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 5:26 PM 640F D1 0 ( 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 16 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493843&questionld=3&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 8:00 PM @ Homework: Chapter 16 Homework Question 11, Concept Question 5.1 HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Part 2 of 2 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list There are 280 automobile drivers per minute who are considering using the E-Z Pass lanes of the Interstate 78 bridge over the Delaware River that connects Easton, Pennsylvania and Phillipsburg, New Jersey. With that many autos, and a 5 mph speed restriction through the E-Z pass sensors, there is congestion. We can divide the drivers of these cars into four groups: A, B, C. and D. "Each group has 70 drivers. Each driver in Group i has the following value of crossing the bridge: 1 if 70 or fewer autos cross Question 1 1 - 1 if between 71 and 140 autos cross. 1) - 2 if between 141 and 210 autos cross, and Question 2 1 - 3 if more than 210 cross. Suppose that on = $4, up =$3, mc =$2, and why =$1. The marginal cost of crossing the bridge. not including the marginal cost of congestion, is zero. O Question 3 If the price of crossing equals a driver's marginal private cost-the s per minute will cross? Which groups will cross? If the price of a crossing only equals a driver's private costs, then O Question 4 O A. no drivers will cross. X B. 70 drivers from Group A cross per minute. O Question 5 "C. all 280 drivers cross per minute. O D. 210 drivers from Group A, Group B, and Group C will cross per minute. Question 6 O E. 140 drivers from Group A and Group B will cross per minute n the social optimum, which groups of drivers will cross? That is, which collection of groups crossing will maximize the sum of the drivers' utilities? Question 7 The sum of driver utility will be maximized if O A. all 280 drivers cross per minute. * Question & X B. 70 drivers from Group A cross per minute. O C. 210 drivers from Group A. Group B, and Group C cross per minute. % Question 9 #D. 140 drivers from Group A and Group B cross per minute. O E. no drivers cross. Question 10 * Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 % Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Similar question Type here to search 8:00 PM 2 550F A M D (6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 17 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493844&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 8:1 PM Homework: Chapter 17 Homework Question 11, Text Question 6.1 HW Score: 18.18%, 2 of 11 points Part 1 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list perfume in France? Chanel perfume is sold in France and in the United States. Assume initially that one euro is worth $1.25 and that a 100 ml bottle of perfume sells for $84 in the United States. If Chanel does not price discriminate internationally, what is the price that would be paid for this K The price of the perfume in France is ] euros. (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.) O Question 1 * Question 2 * Question 3 Question 4 O Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 x Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Help me solve this Grapher Ask my instructor Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 8:11 PM Rain... A 01 3 4 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 10 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493833&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 3:29 PM @ Homework: Chapter 10 Homework Question 11, Text Question 5.4 HW Score: 15.83%, 2.5 of 16 points Part 1 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is K p = 120- 2q. where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Question 1 Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club. Th r believes that Susan's inverse demand curve is Question 2 p = 100 -2q much more would the ch if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices? The manager has a policy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers them both a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club's profit? Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee than in Joe's original deal? How O Question 3 The club maximizes profit subject to the policy by charging a per round price of O Question 4 and a lump-sum fee of F =$. Question 5 Enter your responses as whole numbers.) O Question 6 x Question 7 Question 8 O Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 * Question 12 O Question 13 % Question 14 O Question 15 Question 16 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 3:29 PM If Tem.. A D e (6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 12 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493839&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 4:52 PM @ Homework: Chapter 12 Homework HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list As the first of a new class of anti-ulcer drugs, Tagamet was extremely successful when it was introduced. However, the second entrant, K Zantac, rapidly took the lion's share of the market. Zantac works similarly to Tagamet but has fewer side effects, could be taken less a frequently when it was first introduced, and was promoted more effectively. enter The extensive-form game illustrated in the figure to the right shows the payoffs for Tagamet and Zantac entering the market, where Question 1 Tagamet moves first. Enter Suppose Zantac's profit from not entering is always zero and that Zantac's profit from entering is always positive. No entry * Question 2 Zantac will have a higher profit than Tagamet, if A. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than $1. Enter O Question 3 O B. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than 30. O C. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $0 No entry Zantac O D. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is smaller than $2 No entry % Question 4 O E. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $1. O Question 5 O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 O Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 5:06 PM ? Suns... Di e (76 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 14 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493841&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:26 PM @ Homework: Chapter 14 Homework Question 10, Text Question 5.2 HW Score: 10.81%, 1.17 of 11 points Part 1 of 3 Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Evan is risk-seeking with respect to gains and risk-averse with respect to losses. Louise is risk-seeking with respect to losses K and risk-averse with respect to gains. Illustrate both utility functions. Which person's attitudes toward risk are consistent with prospect theory? Which of these people would you expect to be susceptible to framing effects? 1.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Evan's utility function for gains. Label this curve "Gainsevan." O Question 1 2.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Evan's utility function for losses. Label this curve 'LossesEvan." Question 2 B.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Louiss's utility function for gains. Label this curve 'GainsLouisa 1.) Using the three-point curved line drawing fool, graph Louiss's utility function for losses. Label this curve 'LossesLouisa. i- Losses Gains O Question 3 Carefully follow the instructions above, and only draw the required objects. O Question 4 Outcome * Question 5 % Question 6 Question 7 O Question & % Question 9 Question 10 O Question 11 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help . Clear all Check answer Type here to search ? 5:26 PM 640F D1 0 ( 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 15 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493842&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly Homework: Chapter 15 Homework HW Score: 15.63%, 2.5 of 16 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list K both goods? A monopoly sells two products, of which any given consumer wants to buy only one (and places no value on the other good - i.e. uncorrelated reservation prices). If the monopoly can prevent resale, can it increase its profit by bundling the goods, forcing the consumers to buy With bundling, the monopoly's profits Question 1 O A. will increase because the e combined values of the two goods X B. will increase because reservation prices for the two goods are negatively correlated. Question 2 *C. will not inc an for the valued good. O D. will increase because c vation prices for the two goods are positively correlated. O Question 3 O E. will increase because it will cost less to produce both goods jointly. O Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 x Question 7 Question & Question 9 O Question 10 O Question 11 Question 12 O Question 13 % Question 14 O Question 15 Question 16 Etext pages Grapher Ask my instructor Similar question Type here to search ? it Tem... A 0 0 6 10/28/2023 3:29 PMDo Homework - Chapter 13 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493840&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly 10/28/23 5:06 PM @ Homework: Chapter 13 Homework HW Score: 10.71%, 1.5 of 14 points Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list As the first of a new class of anti-ulcer drugs, Tagamet was extremely successful when it was introduced. However, the second entrant, K Zantac, rapidly took the lion's share of the market. Zantac works similarly to Tagamet but has fewer side effects, could be taken less a frequently when it was first introduced, and was promoted more effectively. enter The extensive-form game illustrated in the figure to the right shows the payoffs for Tagamet and Zantac entering the market, where Question 1 Tagamet moves first. Enter Suppose Zantac's profit from not entering is always zero and that Zantac's profit from entering is always positive. No entry * Question 2 Zantac will have a higher profit than Tagamet, if A. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than $1. Enter O Question 3 O B. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet does not enter is larger than 30. O C. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $0 No entry Zantac O D. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is smaller than $2 No entry % Question 4 O E. Zantac's profit from entering when Tagamet enters is larger than $1. O Question 5 O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 Question 13 O Question 14 Help me solve this Etext pages Get more help - Clear all Check answer Type here to search 5:06 PM ? Suns... Di e (76 10/28/2023 EDo Homework - Chapter 15 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493842&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly Homework: Chapter 15 Homework HW Score: 17.86%, 2.5 of 14 points @ Points: 0 of 1 Save Question list Derive the mixed strategy equilibrium if both Intel and AMD act simultaneously in the game in the Managerial Solution K Intel and AMD, the dominant central processing unit manufacturers, decide whether to set their advertising levels low or high. For now. suppose that they play this game once, act simultaneously, and their profits are symmetric. If both choose low levels of advertising. Intel Intel's profit, m. and AMD's profit, an, are each 2. If both choose high, each earns 3. If Intel's advertising is high and AMD's is low, x, =9 Question 1 and KA =5. If Intel's advertising is low and AMD's is high, 1 = 5 and IA =9. LOW High Let the probability that a firm chooses low be a for Intel and A for AMD. If the firms choose their advertising independently, then op is the * Question 2 probability that both choose low advertising, (1 - a)(1 - () is the probability that both choose high advertising, a(1 - P) is the probability that Intel chooses low and AMD chooses high, and (1 - a)) is the probability that Intel chooses high and AMD chooses low. LOVE X A. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to se at the low price (a = B= 1) O Question 3 AMD "B. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Intel to choose low with probability 0.222 (a = 0.222) and for AMD to choose low with 53 probability 0.222 (8 =0.222). % Question 4 O C. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the high price (a = p = 0). O D. This game has no mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. O Question 5 O E. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Intel to choose low with probability 0.778 (a =0.778) and for AMD to choose low with probability 0.778 (8 =0.778). O Question 6 O Question 7 Question & O Question 9 * Question 10 Question 11 O Question 12 O Question 13 * Question 14 Help me solve this Grapher Ask my instructor Similar question Type here to search ? 5:08 PM 650F A D1 3 (16 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 15 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493842&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly Homework: Chapter 15 Homework Question 13, Text Question 6.2 HW Score: 22.44%, 2.82 of 13 points Part 2 of 2 Points: 0.33 of 1 Save Question list Curtis manages an electronics store in Wichita, Kansas. He considers carrying either cameras from Nikon Americas that come with a U.S. warranty or black market Nikon cameras from a European supplier, which are the same cameras but their warranties are only good in K Europe. The black market cameras have a lower wholesale price. Curtis earns 10% of the store's profit (and no wage). If the store loses money, he leaves with nothing. He believes that if he sells the Nikon Americas cameras, the s the store's profit will be $1,600,000. The profit on the black market cameras is more uncertain-will locals be willing to buy a less expensive camera without a warranty? Question If he goes with the black market camera, he believes that there's a 50%% chance that the store's profit will be $4,000,000 and a 50%% probability that the store will lose $1,200,000 Curtis and the store's owner are both risk neutral. Which camera does Curtis choose to sell? What choice would the owner prefer (if he was fully informed)? O Question 2 Curtis will choose to sell balck market Nikons and the store er will prefer Curtis sell Nikons Americas cameras Construct an alternative comp ition plan involving a salary such that Curtis will earn as much from selling Nikon Americas cameras and that will dissuade him from selling black market cameras if doing so lowers the owner's expected earnings. O Question 3 Curtis would be dissuaded ir meras if his compensation were A. a fixed salary of $200,000 regardless of store profits % Question 4 X B. a fixed salary of $200.000 plus 10%% of store profits O C. a salary equal to 10%% of store revenues Question 5 D. a fixed salary of $180,000 unless the store loses money. O E. a salary equal to 20%% of store profits * Question 6 x Question 7 % Question & O Question 9 Question 10 * Question 11 O Question 12 % Question 13 Help me solve this Grapher Ask my instructor Similar question Type here to search 7:34 PM ? Rain... ~ 0 4 6 10/28/2023Do Homework - Chapter 15 Homework - Google Chrome X " mylab.pearson.com/Student/PlayerHomework.aspx?homeworkld=659493842&questionld=1&flushed=false&cld=7584450¢erwin=yes BUS 505 Multinational Economics of Technology Fall 2023 Robert Kelly Homework: Chapter 15 Homework Question 13, Text Question 6.2 HW Score: 22.44%, 2.82 of 13 points Part 2 of 2 Points: 0.33 of 1 Save Question list Curtis manages an electronics store in Wichita, Kansas. He considers carrying either cameras from Nikon Americas that come with a U.S. warranty or black market Nikon cameras from a European supplier, which are the same cameras but their warranties are only good in K Europe. The black market cameras have a lower wholesale price. Curtis earns 10% of the store's profit (and no wage). If the store loses money, he leaves with nothing. He believes that if he sells the Nikon Americas cameras, the s the store's profit will be $1,600,000. The profit on the black market cameras is more uncertain-will locals be willing to buy a less expensive camera without a warranty? Question If he goes with the black market camera, he believes that there's a 50%% chance that the store's profit will be $4,000,000 and a 50%% probab