DQ 02 Case: Stanley opened a business account at his local bank in the name of SRJ Enterprises. He deposited $100 and told the bank that the company was located at the home address of his girlfriend, Phoebe, a disgruntled colleague from his employer's accounting department. Using his home computer, Stanley printed bogus invoices in the name of SRJ Enterprises. Phoebe created a vendor record for SRJ Enterprises on the company's computer and put the bogus invoice in a stack of much larger invoices for payment and approval. This scheme continued for a year and netted more than $700,000 for Stanley and Phoebe. Stanley's wife became suspicious and called the organization's internal auditor, who tracked down the fraud. As first-time offenders, Phoebe and Stanley only got probation. But Phoebe and Stanley's wife both left him! The authority to add vendors should not reside with someone such as Phoebe who can submit invoices for payment. A typical control to address this type of fraud is to carefully manage the process for creating vendor records. When vendor records are created, as a minimum, relevant information such as address, phone number, and contact person should be verified. Also, a comparison should be made between the vendor's information (e.g., name, phone number, address) and employee information (e.g., name phone number, address). For each fraud, describe controls and technology that could reduce the risk of those frauds occurring