Due to technological advancements in the use of labour and in the ability to extract deeper and smaller mineral deposits more efficiently, and the emergence of new uses for Mineral X have all contributed to a change in the prospective viability of the mine. In 2021, a Uruguayan company, Poderoso Inc. (PI), bought the site and accompanying permissions to operate the mine, for a nominal $50,000. Not only is that figure very low, Poderoso also avoided having to assume legal responsibility for any (past/current) environmental contaminants, above ground, on the mine site. The NL Government has willing to retain that environmental liability, and to sell the site so cheaply, because of the potential for new jobs in rural NL. Poderoso has agreed that they will not seek, and will not receive, capital or operating subsidies to operate the mine. That is a settled issue, and so to are management's expectations for the future. Foreign owners are not in Buchans to lose money. They will not tolerate operating an unprofitable mine in the long run. On the other hand, the NL Government does not have the money to provide subsidies anyway! The re-opening of the JM is being managed by 5 executive staff from Poderoso, three of which are corporate experts from Uruguay. The other two are local mining managers with expert local knowledge of mining (and managing resource-sector workers) in the province. Once the mine is operational, there will probably be another 7 non-union, management/supervisory and professional staff overseeing the unionized staff, for a total of 12 in total. Strangely, Poderoso has agreed with representatives of the Wobbly Union (WU), a small international trade union based out of Charles Town, West Virginia USA, will represent the blue-collar workers employed by Poderoso at the Joey Mine1. PI and WU have been negotiating terms of a first collective agreement for several months. Suppose that PI is insistent that they will not start operations of the JM until a collective agreement is in place, to ensure that the cost structure makes it feasible to re-open. Suppose, also, that the WU is not going to cave in to PI, because the union execs know that the first contract will set a precedent. Suppose, finally, that there are some structural issues with the JM that make it impossible to operate for 17 weeks from the beginning of November to the end of February, given Newfoundland weather. Moreover, the particular production method required to be utilized by PI at the JM means that they are not prepared to start operations during this upcoming production year, if they miss the usual seasonal start-up date of March 01.. Thus, if a settlement is not reached during this scheduled round of bargaining in late February 2023, then start-up of the mine will not begin prior to March, 2024! That would be painful for both sides, but especially for the WU and the local, provincial, and other workers hoping to be hired immediately by PI. It can be assumed that JM will be a 'union shop' site. As bargaining unit workers are hired, they will be required to join the WU on their start date. The PI and WU have agreed that the length of this first collective agreement will be four years (i.e. March 01/23 - Feb 28/27) if the other 8 terms get settled during these final negotiations.

1. Please list and describe three separate and distinct personnel/staffing challenges that PI faces as it tries to re-open the Joey Mine in early 2023.

2. Please describe the dispersion of bargaining power between PI and WU in this simulation. That is, i) describe which side held more power in your view, and ii) describe how evenly divided was that bargaining power in the Feb 2023 negotiations, and briefly defend your two answers.