Each of two players begins by putting a dollar in the pot. Player 1 is then dealt a card that is equally likely to be High or Low; she observes her card, but player 2 does not. Player 1 may see or raise. If she sees, she shows her card to player 2. (Player 2 does not have any card for player 1 to see, but you can imagine her holding a fixed card with value between High and Low). Player 1 has two information sets, one containing the single history High and one containing the single history Low. Player 2 has one information set, consisting of the two histories (High, Raise) and (Low, Raise). Consider a generalization of the card game above in which the amount added to the pot when player 1 raises and player 2 meets is $k. (In the example above, k = 1). Find the Nash Equilibrium of this game for anyk>0