Construct player l's best response diagram for all mixed and full strategies of their opponent. Player 1 Player 2 LCR T 2,0 6,1 3,2 M 6,4 2,2 1,3 B 1.3 4,2 5,0 Player 1 assigns the following probability to each of the actions of player 2: p= P(L), q= P(C), and 1-p-q=P(R). Plot those comparisons on a graph with p = P(L) on the x-axis and q = P(C) on the y-axis. Note that this graph implicitly includes P(R) since P(R) =1-p-q. Shade and label areas where a given strategy is a best response. That is shade the probability combinations of p, q where the expected utility is highest for a given choice. You may also label choices which a player is indifferent between two choices. For what belief about player 2's strategies will player 1 be content with randomizing with equal probability over his own strategies.