Consider the following statements: A game of imperfect information means that at least one of the players do not know the complete history of the game when it comes time for them to move. Common knowledge of a particular item in a game means that all players know it and all know that all others know it and so on.... All games are games of perfect information since it is assumed that the players know each others strategies. (1) (n.) (1) Choose the best answer. a. Only statements (i) and (iii) are true. b. Only statements (0) and (ii) are true. c. Only statement () is true. d. Only statement (ii) is true. b) Which of the following statements is true? A sequential-move game a can be depicted in extensive form b. is fully described by the list of players and the actions that are available to them. c. cannot in any circumstances, be thought of as a simultaneous-move game if the players do not get a chance to observe the other players' actions when making their decisions. d. always has a solution to backward induction that favors the player that moves first. c) When a player has a dominant strategy in a certain game, we can say the following. If he uses that strategy, then given whatever action his opponent has chosen, his resulting payoff of the game is certainly higher than a his opponent's payoff b. any other payoff that is possibly available to him in that game. c. the payoff he would have earned had he used a different strategy. d. the payoff he would have received had he played his best response to what his opponent played. d) Which of the following statements is true and best completes the sentence? The iterated dominance elimination procedure assures us that a. simultaneous-move games are dominance solvable. b. players will only play a strategy that is a best response to a strategy played by the other player. c. players will avoid playing strategies that are dominated by one or more strategies. d. weak dominance is just as robust as strict dominance when it is utilized as a common solution procedure. +) A security strategy equilibrium a. if it exists in a zero-sum game is also a dominant strategy equilibrium b. if it exists in a game that is not constant (or zero-sum) is also a Nash equilibrium. c. if it exists in a zero-sum game, can be found using the maximin criterion for choosing strategies. d. always exists in games when players use their pure strategies Consider the following statements: A game of imperfect information means that at least one of the players do not know the complete history of the game when it comes time for them to move. Common knowledge of a particular item in a game means that all players know it and all know that all others know it and so on.... All games are games of perfect information since it is assumed that the players know each others strategies. (1) (n.) (1) Choose the best answer. a. Only statements (i) and (iii) are true. b. Only statements (0) and (ii) are true. c. Only statement () is true. d. Only statement (ii) is true. b) Which of the following statements is true? A sequential-move game a can be depicted in extensive form b. is fully described by the list of players and the actions that are available to them. c. cannot in any circumstances, be thought of as a simultaneous-move game if the players do not get a chance to observe the other players' actions when making their decisions. d. always has a solution to backward induction that favors the player that moves first. c) When a player has a dominant strategy in a certain game, we can say the following. If he uses that strategy, then given whatever action his opponent has chosen, his resulting payoff of the game is certainly higher than a his opponent's payoff b. any other payoff that is possibly available to him in that game. c. the payoff he would have earned had he used a different strategy. d. the payoff he would have received had he played his best response to what his opponent played. d) Which of the following statements is true and best completes the sentence? The iterated dominance elimination procedure assures us that a. simultaneous-move games are dominance solvable. b. players will only play a strategy that is a best response to a strategy played by the other player. c. players will avoid playing strategies that are dominated by one or more strategies. d. weak dominance is just as robust as strict dominance when it is utilized as a common solution procedure. +) A security strategy equilibrium a. if it exists in a zero-sum game is also a dominant strategy equilibrium b. if it exists in a game that is not constant (or zero-sum) is also a Nash equilibrium. c. if it exists in a zero-sum game, can be found using the maximin criterion for choosing strategies. d. always exists in games when players use their pure strategies Consider the following statements: A game of imperfect information means that at least one of the players do not know the complete history of the game when it comes time for them to move. Common knowledge of a particular item in a game means that all players know it and all know that all others know it and so on.... All games are games of perfect information since it is assumed that the players know each others strategies. (1) (n.) (1) Choose the best answer. a. Only statements (i) and (iii) are true. b. Only statements (0) and (ii) are true. c. Only statement () is true. d. Only statement (ii) is true. b) Which of the following statements is true? A sequential-move game a can be depicted in extensive form b. is fully described by the list of players and the actions that are available to them. c. cannot in any circumstances, be thought of as a simultaneous-move game if the players do not get a chance to observe the other players' actions when making their decisions. d. always has a solution to backward induction that favors the player that moves first. c) When a player has a dominant strategy in a certain game, we can say the following. If he uses that strategy, then given whatever action his opponent has chosen, his resulting payoff of the game is certainly higher than a his opponent's payoff b. any other payoff that is possibly available to him in that game. c. the payoff he would have earned had he used a different strategy. d. the payoff he would have received had he played his best response to what his opponent played. d) Which of the following statements is true and best completes the sentence? The iterated dominance elimination procedure assures us that a. simultaneous-move games are dominance solvable. b. players will only play a strategy that is a best response to a strategy played by the other player. c. players will avoid playing strategies that are dominated by one or more strategies. d. weak dominance is just as robust as strict dominance when it is utilized as a common solution procedure. +) A security strategy equilibrium a. if it exists in a zero-sum game is also a dominant strategy equilibrium b. if it exists in a game that is not constant (or zero-sum) is also a Nash equilibrium. c. if it exists in a zero-sum game, can be found using the maximin criterion for choosing strategies. d. always exists in games when players use their pure strategies