Evolutionary Stable StrategiesConsider the following game of states in a federation. SouthernStatesRule of LawCorruption Northern States Rule of Law 10, 100,4 Corruption 4, 08, 8Question 23 (1 point) The game classifies as aQuestion 23 options:Battle of sexes gameStag-hunt gamePure coordination gamePrisoners' DilemmaQuestion 24 (1 point) In pure strategies, which principle would predict one Nash Equilibrium only?Question 24 options:Immanuel's Kant's categorical imperativeJohn McLane's "Die hard" principleEdith Piaf's "La vie en rose" principle"Pareto superiorityQuestion 25 (1 point) Assume that the Northern and Southern States mix the strategies "Rule of Law" and "Corruption" randomly with probability p=0.5. What would then be the expected payoff when the strategy "Rule of Law" is played?Question 25 options:4567Question 26 (1 point) Assume that the Northern and Southern States mix the strategies "Rule of Law" and "Corruption" randomly with probability p=0.5. What would then be the expected payoff when the strategy "Corruption" is played?Question 26 options:4567Question 27 (1 point) Assume that the federation is initially in a pure strategies Rule of Law/Rule of Law Nash equilibrium. But then, for whatever reason, politicians start experimenting with the mutation "Corruption" with probability p=0.5. Under this mixed strategy, which statement is true?Question 27 options:Rule of law is still resistant to the "Corruption" mutation (meaning that "Rule of Law" is still earning a higher expected payoff than "Corruption")Rule of law is no longer resistant to the "Corruption" mutation (meaning that "Rule of Law" is now earning a lower expected payoff than "Corruption")Rule of law is now at the margin of being no longer resistant to the "Corruption" mutation (meaning that "Rule of Law" is now earning the same expected payoff as "Corruption")All of the above could be true. One would need more information.Question 28 (1 point) Assume that the federation is initially in a pure strategies Rule of Law/Rule of Law Nash equilibrium. Considering "Corruption" to be a mutation to the existing equilibrium, up to which probability is the Rule of Law/Rule of Law equilibrium resistant against the "Corruption" mutation?Question 28 options:p

Evolutionary Stable Strategies Consider the following game of states in a federation. Southern States Rule of Law Corruption Rule of Law 10. 10 0.4 Northern States Corruption 4. 0 8. 8