Exercise 1. Consider the symmetric two-player game shown below. Let o = (15: 18: 18) (1 5 2 ). For the game shown, (a, a) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Player 2 Player 1 2,2 6. 3 7, 4 3.6 3.3 9,4 C 4.7 4.9 1, 1 (a) The population state o is an evolutionarily stable state of the corresponding evolutionary game (you are not required to check this). Use Theorem 8.3 from the textbook to show that (o,o) is the only symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game. Recall that a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is one where both players play the same strategy (mixed or pure). (b) Explain why the result from part (a) implies that a is the only evolutionarily stable state for the corresponding evolutionary game. Remark: No explicit calculations are required for this exercise. Review and apply the relevant theorem