"Explain how field grade officers lead in the development of ethical organizations to achieve results". (From the perspective of LTC (P) Fernandez)

Introduction

Soldiering on in today's Army is no easy task. As personnel of the 4^th Armored Brigade Combat Team, we are recipients of a rich and encouraging history that is still growing. The Army continues to grow, expand, and improve and we will continue to improve, expand, and grow with it. As Brigade Commander I understand the position and importance of the field grade officer and how it remains a position that is central to the development of an ethical organization that achieves results.

Interests

After reading and reviewing the provided Case Study, I have decerned, assessed and identified the key provision and most probable obstacle facing the 4^th ABCT, and that is the provision of problem solving. Any organization the Army included, must adequately master the organizational skill of problem solving. Our ability to problem solve does and will always determine an ethical and favorable outcome for us as soldiers, and for the Army generically. My particular interest when considering this key provision is the leadership of the field grade officer in our development and achievement of sustainable results.

Vision

My vision as Brigade Commander encompasses transformation. I am sensitive to the tragic and unfortunate loss of leadership during the Afghanistan deployment. I am also uniquely aware of prior setbacks and limitations in what should have been an effective day-to-day management of the 4^th ABCT pertaining to communication boundaries. I am also respectively aware of your concerns involving a highly stressful redeployment back home to your loved ones. My vision for the 4^th ABCT incorporates transformation through problem solving as both a concept and methodology for continued and sustained success. As stewards of our profession, we have the capacity to remove obstacles and charter our focus towards personal and professional growth. My recommended steps to achieving results follows an example set by Bill Bratton, (former New York City Police Commissioner) of identifying and endorsing committed leaders and key problem solvers. Within our boundaries my focus on this endorsement is the field grade officer.

End State

The acknowledgement of the field grade officer as a key problem solver is a practical and organizational path to success. The employment of Bill Bratton's key strategy coupled with his reinvention of an organizational wheel provides a bird's eye view on how to increase morale, increase productivity reflected on Command surveys, and increase the ethical confidence and overall organizational status. As we move forward in the 4^thABCT highly anticipated future, I invite you to join me in this new endeavor of problem solving, so we may work as a team in securing a successful path to our future with confidence.

References

FM 6-22

Change Begins from Within: William Bratton in the NYPD Authors: Mr. Billy D. Miller Jr. and Dr. Michelle A. Miller

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

The Army School System (TASS)

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core

L100: Developing Organizations and Leaders

Take Home Exam for L100

Developing Organizations and Leaders

Question

What is the critical leadership problem facing the 4^th ABCT and how will you use the processes and concepts from L100 to improve the ABCT and achieve your vision? Clearly and comprehensively explain, defend, and justify your answer.

Administrative Instructions:This is your end-of-block exam for L100. The purpose of this assessment is for you to demonstrate your achievement of the TLO for L100, which is: "Analyze organizational level leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations."This examis based on the 4^th Armor Brigade Combat Team case study and L100 learning objectives.

The rubric your instructor will use to assess your answer is available to you on blackboard and provides grading criteria and point breakdown for the essay question.Your answer will be no more than five (5) pages in length (double-spaced, using 12-point Arial Font). Late submission will result in a reduction of ten points per day.

You will answer the question from the perspective of thenew brigade commander, LTC (P) Fernandez. Ensureyou incorporate the criteria in the rubric into your response. In thisindividual essay assignment, you must demonstrate your ability to synthesize the organizational-level leadership processes from L100 and apply them to a problem.

You are LTC (P) Jordan Fernandez. A month ago, you arrived on post to assume command of the 4^th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) after attending the Army War College. The current brigade commander, COL Michael Johnson, is retiring early for medical reasons. Your change of command is in 30 days. COL Johnson has been very gracious in facilitating your access to many aspects of the brigade to help prepare you for assuming command. In the last 30 days, you have had an opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade.

The 4^th ABCT recently returned from Afghanistan and is in the prepare phase of the sustainable readiness model (SRM). The brigade has been back at home station for almost two months and reintegration training and block leave are complete. The most significant event in the next 12 months is the brigade's rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). This rotation is in preparation for a pending regionally aligned forces (RAF) mission. The RAF mission is in support of U.S. Army Europe and requires two maneuver battalions to deploy for nine months. Simultaneously, the RAF mission requires the remainder of the 4^th ABCT to support more than 90 theater security cooperation engagements on the European continent, ranging in size from two-person teams to company plus. While U.S. Army Europe may cancel some of the existing engagements, they expect the number of engagements to increase, many with limited preparation time.

During the recent deployment the 4^th's parent division headquarters and the other divisional BCTs did not deploy with the brigade. Instead, the 4^th ABCT worked for two other divisions and with several other BCTs during their deployment. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 4^th detached one of its combined arms battalions for nine months. This battalion, "The War Hawks," gained a reputation for being star performers and they are very proud of the other division patch they wear on their right shoulder. Many of the current ABCT staff PCS in the next few months. The change of command for three of the battalions occur in the next 60 days. Your initial meetings with COL Johnson, and CSM Dana Kuptain, the brigade command sergeant major, gave you a very positive perception of the ABCT.

From your conversations with several individuals in the last thirty days, you learned that years ago 4^th ABCT had a great reputation. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high and it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The brigade had focus. Leaders and Soldiers were dedicated to the mission and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, but there was a prevailing attitude that most problems could be resolved. More often than not, leaders solved problems at lower levels; they rarely reached the brigade command level. There was competition within the brigade, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Often the brigade and battalion officers met informally for social events. Although these were definitely social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. Other officers in the division often ridiculed brigade officers as "whackos" who always wanted to discuss work issues. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade non-commissioned officers. Now it appears the environment is different. The battalions are competing, not to improve the brigade, but to set themselves apart from their sister units. Camaraderie amongst the battalion commanders and command sergeants major appears superficial.

Over the last month, you had the opportunity to review a number of historical documents, observe routine meetings, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade area.

Your review of the brigade's historical unit status reports indicates the 4^th ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departure. The ABCT deployed at 92 percent strength, although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander's comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well trained and qualified. The majority of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that surfaced within 60 to 90 days prior to the departure date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-combat-related medical problems. While the installation's medical providers addressed many of the non-deployable Soldiers' medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable Soldiers has slightly increased above pre-deployment numbers.

The brigade's historical records from Afghanistan indicate the unit was successful in accomplishing all missions. Two battalions successfully performed security force advisor team (SFAT) missions, albeit with fewer support people than expected. The ABCT commander reassigned personnel from the battalions not involved with SFAT requirements to other battalions of the 4^th. The documents suggest violence in the 4^th's area of operations did not significantly increase, nor did it decrease, and casualties were light. Security of the populace and US forces was a major priority that was accomplished very well, but the records indicate the ABCT's ability to support the host nation was mixed; the SFATs had marginal success influencing Afghan Army units and police forces. It appears the ABCT staff managed day-to-day operations effectively but struggled to capitalize on opportunities and to anticipate potential threats.

Even though the casualties were few in numbers, one critical incident dramatically influenced the ABCT. Approximately three months into the brigade's twelve-month deployment, a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonated on a patrol in one of the maneuver battalion's area of operations. The attack killed the brigade commander, COL Tim Timmons, the brigade command sergeant major, CSM Pat Mullens, one of the battalion commanders, LTC Sandra Page, and wounded several other Soldiers and Afghan security forces. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the brigade deputy commanding officer (DCO), LTC (P) Alex Frazer assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Johnson and CSM Kuptain.

Another document you reviewed is a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report compiled from observations of the 4^th in Afghanistan. From all accounts, the ABCT and its leaders performed as well as possible in Afghanistan, given the circumstances. However, the official record indicates significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the organization's future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report.

Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of multiple combat outposts and forward operating bases (FOBs) created significant digital network challenges for the brigade's network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed, making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade created operational and personal friction.

Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to allow 24-hour operations over a sustained period. Often battle captains were taken "out of hide" to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs. While BN staffs were undermanned, the BDE Staff was adequately manned.

The stability operations mission created unique issues for the 4^th ABCT. Although the size of the ABCT staff had a positive effect on shaping operations within their area of operations, the additional tasks associated with resourcing and supporting the SFATs from members of the staff created a "dual-hatted" staff, reducing the staff's effectiveness.

During the brigade's deployment, the brigade commander tasked the deputy brigade commander to supervise the SFATs operating within the brigade's area of operations; synchronize the operations of the brigade support battalion at a different forward operating base; be the "voice" of the ABCT to the media; act as liaison officer to coalition forces; and act as a chief of staff. These varied missions for the deputy created confusion within the brigade and this confusion created the perception of a weakened ABCT command structure. COL Johnson contributed to this confusion when he left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the deputy brigade commander.

The modular BCT structure created training challenges, especially within the combined arms battalions. Previously the maneuver battalion commanders and staffs were able to focus on traditional infantry and armor skills (e.g., shoot, move, and communicate), the same commanders and staffs were now required to plan and execute individual and collective skills low density MOS training outside their areas of expertise. Moreover, the report identified that this diversification diminished infantry tactical subject-matter expertise, once resident within the maneuver battalions. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) forced the filling of a large number of "patrol sets" to support the mission. This adversely influenced the maneuver units, the brigade's special troops battalion (STB), and the brigade support battalion (BSB). A lack of critical modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorizations especially affected the brigade STB's ability to support both brigade and battalion operations. The dispersed nature of the battalions required the BSB to spend increased time on the roads resupplying outlying locations.

The Army's decision to align two battalions with the SFAT mission just prior to the MRE required the leaders to rethink combat organization. The ABCT never quite compensated for this additional mission even after COL Johnson, who had SFAT experience, arrived to take command. Many key leaders and Soldiers in the ABCT, as well as the division staff, were aware of the strain between the SFAT mission and the combat role of the ABCT.

The Afghanistan environment placed severe demands upon available resources. Specifically, the need to protect the population and expand operations in previously unsecured areas increased the need for infantry squads. As a result, armor, engineer, artillery, and other Soldiers filled the void, performing civilian protection tasks and not their own military occupational skills. Soldiers from the forward support companies also augmented as vehicle drivers and alternate quick reaction forces within the maneuver battalions.

The 4^th ABCT trained for the wrong mission-essential tasks during its training for deployment to Afghanistan. The brigade trained predominantly on combined arms maneuver tasks, with little emphasis on wide area security scenarios. Upon arrival in theater, operational necessity required use of seven versions of mine-resistant armor protected variant vehicles. The brigade was able to train on only one version at home station. The brigade created a driver's training program to train drivers during the first two months in combat with the few assets they had available at the Bagram Airbase reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSOI). Lastly, during pre-deployment train-up, the artillery battalion focused on fire support tasks and not small unit operations.

The CALL report also indicated a potential problem existed within the culture of the organization. The desire to be an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of behaviors that were generally good-natured and helped instill an esprit de corps within the unit. The CALL reports contain information that implies some non-commissioned and junior officers allowed these esprit de corps building events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from esprit building to "sanctioned hazing" according to one junior non-commissioned officer.

The brigade is also working to overcome several equipment readiness challenges because of recurring shortages of class nine for several vehicles, as they adapt to Objective T.

You also reviewed a Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program 360-degree commander and staff assessment of the 4^th ABCT from the Center for Army Leadership. Although Army has discontinued the MSAF program, the summary of trends from the assessment indicates that the staff had the trust and confidence of the subordinate units. It also revealed the non-commissioned officers displayed confidence in their abilities and had good tactical and technical knowledge.

On the other hand, the assessment revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making and fell short of expectations on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. There is a perception by many officers of a lack of concern for leader development by the brigade leadership. The report indicated battalion commanders do not routinely counsel company commanders on their performance and the captains receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater. One company commander commented, "I have always been a top performer, I just do my best and hope it is good enough. If no one is yelling at me, I'm golden."

Recently the ABCT HQ completed a command climate survey. There are some inconsistencies in the survey report. Many of the Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the ABCT, but report stress because of the unknown requirements of the RAF mission and the affect they anticipate it will have on their families. There is clearly some disappointment amongst the leaders in the ABCT. One entry read, "COL Johnson tells us in formations to take care of our families, but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My husband is really fed up with this unit." Another comment reads, "Major Cass (brigade S4) is always talking to the female Soldiers. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. He even goes out of his way to get certain females into his office. I think it is affecting the performance of the section, but what can I do, I am only a specialist." Another comment read, "I am tired of getting chewed out about the smallest of issues. The leadership around here is on edge all the time. We never get anything done. We reinvent the wheel monthly to no purpose. Can't wait to leave." There were also several specific comments about a lack of time to complete assigned tasks and a frustration that despite working long hours nothing seemed to change. You can find no indication that the ABCT leadership took any action on the issues within the survey.

The last historical document you reviewed was the brigades reset plan and timeline. A careful study of the document reveals the brigade returned 55 days ago. The brigade has another 35 days in the prepare phase before transitioning to the ready phase. Of immediate concern is the pending arrival of the unit's containers and redeploying equipment from Afghanistan. The ship arrived at the port 10 days ago and immediately began downloading equipment to rail back to home station. COL Johnson expects the equipment to start arriving this week and be complete over the next two weeks. Of critical importance is the turn-in of ancillary equipment (NBC, NVGs, and radios) to the special repair teams beginning in 10 days. The special repair teams will keep the brigade's equipment for the next four to six weeks to complete technical inspections and repair.

Earlier in the week, you had an opportunity to discuss last week's synchronization conference with COL Johnson. The conference included representatives from Forces Command (FORSCOM), Department of the Army G1, G3/5/7, G4, G8, Army Material Command (AMC), and the division staff primaries. You learned that the program executive office (PEO) ground combat systems representative reported that because the brigade turned in all of its combat platforms prior to deployment, you will not receive your new issue for at least another 14 days. Further, PEO, command, control communication, tactical (CCCT), mentioned the brigade will receive all new TOC equipment, but he did not think the equipment would be ready until another 30 days. The CCCT representative also provided less than optimistic information regarding the brigade's satellite communication packages. Since the brigade chose to forego much-needed system upgrades prior to deployment, the majority of the components on the existing satellite terminals are out-of-date and no longer under warranty. Additionally, the Army is fielding new communication trailer systems over the next three-quarters of the fiscal year, with the brigade's equipment not scheduled for delivery until just before entering the transition phase in 125 days. Lastly, the AMC representative said the ancillary equipment (wheeled vehicles, trailers, water buffalos, MHE, etc.) the brigade turned into AMC prior to the deployment as left behind equipment will be ready for reissue over a 7-week period beginning in 25 days.

The information provided at the conference was grim. The division chief of staff, who attended the final out brief, pledged to COL Johnson that he would remain on top of the division G4 and G8 to ensure program managers and AMC upheld their end of the agreement and returned equipment to the brigade as soon as possible.

The personnel outlook is mixed. The brigade is losing people as they move to new assignments or leave the Army. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for three of the brigade's battalions will occur in the next 60 days. You also know you will not receive a replacement for LTC (P) Frazer, as the brigade lost its DCO position under the newest MTOE. The last personal report indicated that the brigade had 60 to 65 percent of the staff sergeants required. This shortage was based on routine PCSs and transfers of NCOs to organizations deploying prior to 4^th ABCT.

On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing the Command and General Staff Officer Course or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions' strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. There is a significant turnover expected in the officers in the brigade headquarters and among company commanders. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment and expects Human Resource Command to fill the brigade at 80 percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade before assumption of the RAF mission.

CPT Pat Donelson is the brigade S1. He just recently moved up to the brigade S1 section from "The War Hawks." He is a recognized self-starter and well respected in the brigade. Yesterday he was discussing an inbound personnel printout with you and he had some specific concerns. One of the inbound lieutenants is a logistics officer and recent graduate of Ranger School and he wanted to know where to put her. He then commented, "We don't need this kind of attention or problem, and this is going to be a big one. We have to put her somewhere she can't mess up." After mentioning to you he was having trouble finding the equal opportunity (EO) NCO to address a question from the division EO office, CPT Donelson also gave you a heads up about a rash of officer actions from some of the battalions. He said he just dropped off seven packets in COL Johnson's inbox of officers requesting release from active duty. He also mentioned, based on discussions with the battalion adjutants at the last adjutant's call, there would be more requests coming from the battalions.

The brigade S2 is MAJ Pete Sanford. MAJ Sanford appears to be very confident and competent, but he seems extremely anxious about his recommendations since returning from Afghanistan. He has some good systems in place, as well as a good team. He works very hard to be on top of everything. LTC (P) Frazer commented to you during one of your previous conversations "Sanford is overcompensating. He feels responsible for the deaths of the brigade commander, CSM, and the battalion commander. He briefed the threat along the route at one of brigade updates. He just needs to get over it and move on." In the last command and staff, Sanford voiced his concerns about the increasing trends of serious incidence reports and blotter incidents. He said, "I've checked with the other brigades and our numbers are increasing and the other brigades are not."

MAJ Jeff Cass is the brigade S4. The S4 section performed poorly during the last deployment. While Major Cass appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, he clearly does not know how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The battalion commanders note that the S4 section can meet critical supply efforts to support operations, but struggles with the myriad of garrison procedures and associated requirements. The S4 section has conflict with the division G4 that has led to an adversarial relationship. The Soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group.

MAJ Shawn Springsteen, the brigade's S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting you heard her discussing something with the deputy. She commented, "Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I am not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We're not allowed to make routine decisions at our level, and it seems we jump from one crisis to another with no apparent direction. I thought when we returned from Afghanistan the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to get reacquainted with my family. It has been far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise. A division CPX for crying out loud! We just returned from combat! We were told the division's new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division's 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Afghanistan. At least there everyone knows they're working 24/7 and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don't have the family wondering why mommy isn't home. Even my husband, who basically ran the brigade's family readiness group when we were deployed, is about to throw in the towel."

The 4^th ABCT Chaplain is CH (MAJ) Susan Cobb. You remember her from a previous assignment where she served as a battalion chaplain in another division a few years ago. She came in this morning and mentioned she was on the brigade commander's calendar and was bumped, again because "something important came up." This is the fifth time. "I have had real trouble getting in to see him since we returned." Her frustration and concerns were apparent. She went on to say, "You think we have problems, you don't know the half of it, the things I am hearing and seeing should be his priority." She continued voicing her concerns. "Without getting into too much detail I am actively counseling eight separate couples regarding infidelity or other marriage related issues. Many of these seem to involve issues from the last deployment. I never thought I would be this busy once we got home. It never seems to end."

Last week you witnessed an exchange at an ABCT command team meeting. The commander and sergeant major of one of the CABs provided COL Johnson and CSM Kuptain a detailed review on the impact "red cycle" taskings had on unit operations, to include individual training, personnel management, and equipment reset. The battalion commander stated, "We're caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to reconnect with their families after being away for nine months, then pile on so many competing requirements, they have to work until 1900 hours each night. When you add on red-cycle tasks, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When my choice is to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it's more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment from war, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive and taskings."

The battalion command sergeant major added, "This is worse than I've ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division command sergeant major at his last senior non-commissioned officer call, he dismissed me by saying, 'we have had red cycles throughout my 26 years in the Army. They'll always be here, so quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Afghanistan!"

The response of COL Johnson to both of his subordinate leaders was telling. "Look I am not here to do your job for you! Figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or the sergeant major to fix your problems or whine to division about what you can or can't do! Just get it done!"

Your interactions with the officers in the brigade S3 section were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and motivated by MAJ Robert Vega. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the brigade S3. Vega supposedly focuses on the hot issues of the day with little long range planning. They also mentioned Vega's unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Vega indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of whom was new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Frazer, the DCO responded, "That's just Vega flexing his muscle. His system works and there's no better brigade S3 in the division and everyone knows it. Those battalion officers need to quit sniveling and get to work."

In a private conversation last week, CSM Kuptain mentioned, "I'm worried about my senior non-commissioned officers. They appear competent but I don't see any results from their work. They are sick and tired of the constant barrage of taskers, and they don't believe anything they do is making a difference. There is no priority. Yesterday it was that, today it is this. Tomorrow it will be something else. There appears to be little teamwork among them and their officers. When I ask them why they don't speak up and get involved, they ask, 'Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.'"

As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on potential incidents of sexual harassment within the brigade. The conversation centers around one of the "superstar" company commanders, CPT Seth Cooper. As a platoon leader, he was in charge of the personal security detachment (PSD) for COL Johnson. After the deployment, COL Johnson placed CPT Cooper in command ahead of other senior captains waiting for command. The consensus from the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel with whom you spoke is CPT Cooper gets results and is popular with battalion and brigade leaders. Every battalion commander requested CPT Cooper be assigned to his or her battalion after the deployment. However, at least four individuals stated, "CPT Cooper really got around while he was on the PSD." Another stated, "CPT Cooper had a girlfriend at every FOB." When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Frazer, the DCO dismisses the issue by stating "CPT Cooper is very friendly, a real extrovert. Besides, the only person that mentioned anything approaching a complaint was a sub-par Soldier, so COL Johnson dismissed the allegation."

You also found out the ABCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas, domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. While the ABCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases, there is no plan for prevention. The organization seems to be in react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. She mentions to you that the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the last deployment and an OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. The chaplain believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade, with some cases among members of the brigade staff still ongoing. COL Johnson's response to the chaplain's concern about these allegations was simply, "Those are only rumors. Don't bring me that stuff without proof!"

Finally, your informal conversations with friends in the division suggest the 4^th gained a reputation in Afghanistan for being very "heavy-handed" in dealing with locals. While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place/transition of authority, their behavior took a marked downturn after the death of the brigade command team and battalion commander. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade's ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, "Frazer's negative attitude of the Afghans created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it's still there. COL Johnson only made things worse with his hyperbole and force-oriented approach to the security in the ABCT area of operations. You need to be very careful."

The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone numerous changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and CAL assessments, and conversations and observations provided some much-needed information. You know there is not much time before the NTC rotation or when the brigade assumes the RAF mission and there are still many unknowns associated with this new requirement. As you begin to reflect on your upcoming assumption of command you know you need to identify and prioritize the challenges you see within the brigade, identify the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and determine how you will measure success.

Requirement:

See L100 take home exam and grading rubric. The exam question as part of the grading rubric will be available on Blackboard IAW the class schedule.