Family Law for Paralegals Chapter 6

McLeod v Starnes 2012

In this child unusual step of reversing a do which it held that ordering a divorced noncustodial Parent to pay collect Prior in ord mo expenses violated the equal protection clause. art to omooni al wolf Sbateand birds onit to smooni el woll co vio insuppedue A Sylimal to MCLEOD v. STARNESw 396 S.C. 647, 723 S.E.2d 198 (2012) the d I . Justice HEARN. M Less than two years ago, this Court decided Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328 ing 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010), which held that ordering a non-custodial parent to We pay college expenses violates equal protection, thus overruling thirty years of precedent flowing from Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 ch (1979). We granted permission in this case to argue against precedent . .. no so that we could revisit our holding in Webb. Today, we hold that Webb was to wrongly decided and remand this matter for reconsideration in light of the law as it existed prior to Webb. th M st FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ed Kristi Mcleod (Mother) and Robert Starnes (Father) divorced in 1993 fol- or lowing five years of marriage. Mother received custody of their two minor children, and Father was required to pay child support. . .. In August 2006, the parties' older child, Collin, reached the age of majority and enrolled as a student at Newberry College. . . . To help take advantage of this opportunity, he sought all scholarships, loans, and grants that he could. Father wholly supported Collin's decision to attend Newberry. Indeed, Father wrote an e-mail in March 2006 agreeing to repay all of Collin's student loans upon graduation. He even co-signed a promis- sory note for Collin's student loans. Furthermore, in an August 2006 letter, Father agreed to pick up "odd expenses from [Collin]'s education" and told Collin to call him whenever he "needs a little help." Interestingly, Father took it upon himself in that same letter to unilaterally decrease his weekly child support from $175 to $100. Mother later acquiesced in this reduction, apparently in consideration of Father's assurances that he would support Collin while he was in college. However, Father did not uphold his end of the bargain, nor did he regularly pay the percentage of his bonus as required Mother brought the instant action in March 2007 seeking an award of college expenses. .. . Father counterclaimed, asking that the court ter minate: (1) his child support for Collin because he had attained the agnoqqueMcleod v. Starnes majority and graduated from high school. . . . He also denied that he 311 takes the of Old be required to pay any college expenses for Collin. A temporary s prior in sher was filed in June 2007 that . . . ordered Father to contribute $400 per y college month towards Collin's college expenses. ... The final hearing was not conducted until March and July 2009. The ourt dismissed Mother's claim for college expenses on the ground that it "lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.... COLLEGE EXPENSES Mother argues the family court erred in finding that an order requir- S.C. 328, ing Father to pay college expenses for Collin violates equal protection. We agree . arent to ty years In Webb, we held that requiring a parent to contribute toward an adult E.2d 652 child's college expenses violated the Equal Protection Clause. . . . We are dent . .. not unmindful of the imprimatur of correctness which stare decisivends Tebb was to that decision. However, stare decision not an inexorable command. ... t of the . ."Stare decisionld be used to foster stability and certainty in the law, but not to perpetuate error." Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 277 S.C. 1, 4, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1981), superseded by statute on other grounds, S.C. Code Ann. $33-55-200, et seq. (2006). . .. We are at the first practical moment to reexamine Webb, a " single prec- edent case" concerning a constitutional question because it is the first and 993 fol- only case in this State finding an equal protection violation in these cir- minor cumstances. We now believe Webb reversed the burden imposed on parties operating under rational basis review for equal protection challenges and age of should therefore be overruled. lp take In Webb, we were asked to determine whether requiring a non-custodial S, and parent to pay college expenses was a violation of equal protection. . . . Absent attend an allegation that the classification resulting in different treatment is sus- repay Pect, a classification will survive an equal protection challenge so long as it romis- rests on some rational basis. If we can discern any rational basis to support letter, the classification, regardless of whether that basis was the original motiva- d told tion for it, the classification will withstand constitutional scrutiny. . .. Father In Webb, the majority viewed the classification created by Risinger for reekly equal protection purposes as those parents subject to a child support order ction, at the time the child is emancipated. . . . Without any elaboration, the major- pport nd of ity concluded that there is no rational basis for treating parents subject to uired. such an order different than those not subject to one with respect to the ward payment of college expenses. Upon further reflection, we now believe that t ter- we abandoned our long-held rational basis rule that the party challenging e age "classification must prove there is no conceivable basis upon which it can test and inverted the burden of proof. . . .Chapter Six . Child Sup 312 This State has a strong interest in the outcome of disputes where the welfare of our young citizens is at stake. As can hardly be contested, the acrimony State also has a strong interest in ensuring that our youth are educate towards h such that they can become more productive members of our society. It is a reality We n entirely possible "that most parents who remain married to each oth support their children through college years. On the other hand, even well because t intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, some and its pr times react by refusing to support them as they would if the family unit had the need f been preserved." In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1986) stances in Therefore, it may very well be that Risinger sought to alleviate this harm by education "minimizing] any economic and educational disadvantages to children of According divorced parents." Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382, for a deter 1390, 17 Ill. Dec. 801 (Ill. 1978). . . . There is no absolute right to a college tribute to education, and section 63-3-530(A)(17), as interpreted by Risinger and its progeny, does not impose a moral obligation on all divorced parents with children. Instead, the factors identified by Risinger and expounded upon in later cases seek to identify those children whose parents would other- 1. Why d wise have paid for their college education, but for the divorce, and provide noncu them with that benefit. 2. What We accordingly hold that requiring a parent to pay, as an incident decisio of child support, for post-secondary education under the appropriate 3. What and limited circumstances outlined by Risinger is rationally related to the State's interest. While it is certainly true that not all married couples send comes court their children to college, that does not detract from the State's interest in having college-educated citizens and attempting to alleviate the potential 4. What disadvantages placed upon children of divorced parents. Although the which decision to send a child to college may be a personal one, it is not one we child's wish to foreclose to a child simply because his parents are divorced. It is of no moment that not every married parent sends his children to college or that not every divorced parent refuses to do so. The tenets of rational basis review under equal protection do not require such exacting precision in the In this "h decision to create a classification and its effect. todial pa Indeed, Father's refusal to contribute towards Collin's college expenses significar under the facts of this case proves the very ill which Risinger attempted to discussio alleviate, for Father articulated no defensible reason for his refusal other larly whe than the shield erected by Webb. What other reason could there be for a father with more than adequate means and a son who truly desires to attend college to skirt the obligation the father almost certainly would have assumed had he not divorced the child's mother? Had Father and Mother remained married, we believe Father undoubtedly would have contributed towards Collin's education. Collin has therefore fallen victim to the precise Justice N harm that prompted the courts . . . to hold that a non-custodial parent could be ordered to contribute towards a child's college education. Thus, this case amply demonstrates what we failed to recognize in Webb: sometimes the Appellar (Father) separationHowColonna v. Colonna 313 ere the imony of marital litigation impacts a parent's normal sense of obligation ed, the affords his or her children. While this is a harsh and unfortunate reality, "reality nonetheless that Risinger sought to address. .. ucated We now hold Risinger does not violate the Equal Protection Clause ty. It is other cause there is a rational basis to support any disparate treatment Risinger n well- had its progeny created. In fact, the case before us particularly demonstrates some- we need for a rule permitting an award of college expenses in certain circum- nit had winces in order to ensure children of divorce have the benefit of the college 1980) lucation they would have received had their parents remained together. arm by Accordingly, we reverse the order of the family court and remand this matter dren of fora determination of whether and in what amount Father is required to con- d 1382, Tribute to Collin's college education under the law as it existed prior to Webb. college and its s with upon other- 1. Why did the Webb court conclude that it was unconstitutional to require rovide noncustodial parents to contribute to their children's college expenses? 2. What interests of the state did the court take into account in reaching its cident decision? priate 3. What did the court have to say about noncustodial parents when it to the comes to helping their children with college expenses? What did the s send court say about this father in particular? rest in 4. What exactly did the court rule with regard to the circumstances under tential which it may be appropriate to order a parent to help with his or her gh the child's college expenses? ne we It is of ge or I basis in the In this "high income" case, the Pennsylvania high court ordered the cus- odial parent to pay child support to the noncustodial parent based on the enses significant disparity in their incomes. The decision provides an interesting ted to discussion of the relationship between support and child custody, particu- other larly when one takes the views of the dissent into account. for a res to I have 1other COLONNA v. COLONNA buted 581 Pa. 1, 855 A.2d 648 (2004) Justice