\fConsider the "guess the number" game described in question 3. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? O [P1 =0, P2=0) [P1=1/3, P2=0) O [P1 =0, P2=1/3] O [P1=1/3, P2=1/3) QUESTION 11 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. What is Player 1's best response when Player 2 chooses right, and Player 3 chooses right? Left O Right O Up O Down QUESTION 12 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. What is Player 2's best response when Player 1 chooses up, and Player 3 chooses right? O Left O Right Up O Down QUESTION 13 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. What is Player 3's best response when Player 1 chooses up, and Player 2 chooses left? O Left O Right O Up estion Completion Status: QUESTION 14 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. What is Player 2's best response when Player 1 chooses down, and Player 3 chooses righ O Up O Down O Left O Right QUESTION 15 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. Is the following a Nash equilibrium? (Player 1=Down, Player 2=Right, Player 3=Left] ? Yes. O No. QUESTION 16 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. Is the following a Nash equilibrium? [Player 1=Up, Player 2=Right, Player 3=Left) ? O Yes. O No. QUESTION 17 Consider the 3 player game considered in question 4. Is the following a Nash equilibrium? (Player 1=Down, Player 2=Right, Player 3=Right) ? Yes. O No.Consider the game in Question 2. For which values of e are the strategy profiles (Player 1=A, Player 2=B), (Player 1=B, Player 2=A), and (Player 1=B, Player 2=B] all Nash equilibria? O All possible values of e. No solution exists. e equal to 2 e equal to 4 QUESTION 9 Consider the "guess the number" game described in question 3. While graph represents the best responses of the players? a2 a1 a 2 a2 a1 a 2 a1 a2 a1 a1 a 2 1a1 az a2 a1 estion Completion Status: a1