: From the industry perspective, what benefits arise from the safe harboring of most swap agreements from the normal operation of the Bankruptcy Code? For example, how might the existence of the safe harbors influence the pricing of a swaps deal?

Stephen Lubben, Corporate Finance Third Edition

A. Options, Warrants, and Convertibles pg.109 Chapter 17 p 427

1. Options pg.109 p 427 - 431

2. Warrants pg.112 p 431

Paul R. Lohnes, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Level 3 Communications, INC., Defendant, Appellee pg.112 p 431

3. Convertibles pg.118 p 442-445

Jefferies Converts Knight Preferred, Boosting Shares Outstanding pg.119

William F. Lorenz V. CSX Corporation (Formerly Chessie Systems, INC.) p 445; The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad; The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. pg.120

B. Derivatives pg.125 Chapter 18 p 455 - 469

1. Forwards and Futures pg.127 p 455 - 469

2. Swaps pg.128 p 493 - 500

Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of chapter 11 pg.128 p 514-518

U.S. Company Credit-Default Swaps Decline After Bernanke Speech pg.133

3. Equity Derivatives pg.135

Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors pg.135 p 500 - 501

4. Derivatives and Leverage pg.136 p 468 - 469

5. Margin and Termination pg.138 p 469 - 480

Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration), Plaintiff, v. AG Financial Products, INC., Defendant pg.139 p 471

Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors pg.144 p 477 - 480