Game theory

H L H 1, 1 -1, 110 L 110, -1 0, 0Tit for Tat Strategy Consider again the innitely repeated version of the simultaneous move stage depicted in the question above. Consider the following tit for tat strategy prole. Each player plays H in the rst period and then in any subsequent period t > 1 plays what her opponent played in the previous period (in t 1). Let the common discount factor be 6. (a). Write down the average discounted payoff that each player gets from following this strategy prole. (b). Write down the average discounted payoff that the row player gets if she plays L in the rst period and then continues to play according to the tit for tat strategy from period 2 onwards. (c). Suppose the common discount factor is 6 = %, would the tit for tat strategy constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game? Would it at least be a Nash equilib rium of the repeated game