Game Theory Porsche vs. Targa The next questions refer to the following game. Porsche and Ferrari compete in the sports car market with new models. Below table shows the firms strategies and payoffs. Porsche Targa Carrera California 1,2 4,3 Ferrari Spider 2,1 3,6 Question 31 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Targa, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California Spider Question 32 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Carrera, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California O Spider Question 33 (1 point) For Ferrari, launching the Spider is O a dominant strategy O not a dominant strategy a Ciao Bella strategy not a Ciao Bello strategyQuestion 34 (1 point) For Porsche, launching the Carrera is a O a dominant strategy not a dominant strategy O Vorsprung-durch-Technik strategy O None of the above. Question 35 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is O California-Targa California-Carrera O Spider-Targa O Spider-Carrera Question 36 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is not a prisoner's dilemma the social optimum O a prisoner's dilemma O the result of each car manufacturer having a dominant strategy Question 37 (1 point) Assume cooperation were possible. Which deal between Porsche and Ferrari would allow for reaching the social optimum? O None. No cooperation already leads to the social optimum. Porsche pays Ferrari $2 to launch the Spider instead of the California. O Ferrari pays Porsche $1 to launch the Targa instead of the Carrera. Both b. and c. are correct