GHANA INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (GIMPA) GREENHILL COLLEGE 2019/2020 END OF SECOND SEMESTER EXAMINATION TITLE OF PAPER: STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT LEVEL/PROGRAMME: 400 BSCOS DATE: TUESDAY, JUNE 23 & WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 2020 EXAMINER: JOSEPH BROWNE TIME ALLOWED: TWENTY-FOUR (24) HOURS INSTRUCTIONS Answer ALL the Questions VENUE: TAKE-HOME BSCOS - Level 400 Second Semester - 2019/2020 Final Exam - (Take Home) - 24Hrs Course no. OSC409A/OSCM409 - STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT by JOSEPH BROWNE CASE STUDY (Marks 100) General Motors Profile: Driving Customer Satisfaction Faced with declining market share and a changing industry, General Motors (GM) launched an ambitious effort that transformed its supply chain and made customer satisfaction a priority. In the late 1990s, the Internet seemed poised to transform the automobile industry. Consumers armed with information could quickly compare prices, options, quality, and service - and make more informed choices. New business models threatened to squeeze industry margins and disrupt the longstanding original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-dealer relationship. General Motors observed these changes warily. The world's largest vehicle manufacturer, GM had revenue of $185.5 billion, production facilities in 32 countries, and a workforce of about 325,000. In 2003, the company sold more than 8.6 million cars and trucks - about 15 percent of the global vehicle market. Despite its size and clout though, GM had seen its global market share erode from 17.7 percent in the early 1990s to 15 percent in 2002, mainly due to declining levels of customer satisfaction and competition from foreign imports. The industry had changed. In the 1970s and 1980s, GM alone decided what products to make - with little input from dealers or customers. Explains Harold Kutner, group vice president of worldwide purchasing and production control and logistics at the time, \"We were an arrogant company. We had an attitude of 'we will make it, and the customer will take it'\". This attitude typified the 'Big Three' automakers at the time. Running plants at full capacity was the name of the game - whether or not the vehicles being made were the ones customers wanted. THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE By the late 1990s the need for change was becoming clear. Consumers were more savvy, powerful, and demanding. Yet GM's responsiveness lagged the industry. Dealers grew increasingly frustrated by the mix of inventory foisted on them. Even in key markets, dealer lots were clogged with over 100 days of supply. To clear out slow-moving products, GM had to offer sales incentives, which squeezed profit margins. Dealers could not get the vehicles they wanted - the vehicles their customers wanted. Desirable options such as aluminum wheels, leather interiors, and V8 engines often were not available in adequate quantities. Unavailable options, or constraints, were high at GM dealerships relative to the industry as a whole, averaging tens of thousands of orders affected at any given time over the range of GM products. This meant that customers could rarely get their first-choice vehicle. As a result, they often settled for more basic, lower-margin models, which ultimately hurt GM's bottom line. Customers who chose to special-order a vehicle had to wait as long as 70 to 80 days for it to arrive. Furthermore, GM was uncertain of its delivery-date reliability because delivery-date promises were not tracked at the time, and neither dealers nor customers had any way of checking on the status of their orders - there was no visibility into GM's order-fulfilment process. At the same time, the company's supply chain costs were growing. High levels of raw materials and work-in-progress inventory, inefficient processes, outdated information-technology systems, and bloated overhead resulted in a costly, sluggish organisation - at a time when streamlined operations were becoming more and more critical. Now, with market share down and Internet-driven change on the horizon, GM knew that it could no longer operate as it once had if it hoped to remain a market leader. 2 Change at the mammoth company would not be easy. After all, GM made over 30,000 vehicles every day, using over 160,000 parts from a vast network of global suppliers - a staggeringly complex undertaking. Brad Ross, head of GM's global order-to-delivery (OTD) organisation, describes the process as a \"tremendously orchestrated set of events that integrates orders across sales, manufacturing, and logistics, resulting in what we refer to as the daily miracle of production\". GM's OTD process encompasses four of the Supply-Chain Operations Reference-model's key supply chain processes - plan, source, make, and deliver. Given this complexity, transforming OTD would be like 'turning the Titanic around on the Flint River', notes Kutner. Yet that is what GM set out to do. The goal? To ship customer orders in less time, with less inventory, at a lower cost - and to satisfy customers better than anyone else in the industry. THE NEW MANDATE: SENSE AND RESPOND GM's ambitious undertaking meant moving from a make-and-sell to a sense-and-respond organisation. First, the company had to start tuning into what customers wanted by sensing the marketplace better. GM had been making the wrong products. Its declining market share and the glut of inventory at the dealer lots were proof of that. Notes Ross, \"In this business, product is everything. The supporting processes are important, but without the right product in the right place at the right time, you are not even in the game\". Second, GM had to put in place an organisation that could respond more quickly and effectively to customer demand - and provide better service quality. This meant rethinking key processes and replacing the functional mind-set with a more cross-functional, collaborative approach. The Internet became a critical tool for sensing consumer preferences and market trends. In collaboration with dealers, GM developed BuyPower, an online portal that lets potential customers get detailed product and dealer information. By monitoring the 'click streams' of online shoppers doing vehicle research, GM now gained a wealth of information that helped with product development, production planning, and sales forecasting. The company also set up dealer councils, regular forums for getting dealer input on consumer trends and better ways to sell. To align real demand with production schedules - and provide visibility into the OTD process - GM upgraded its vehicle order management (VOM) system to allow dealers access through the Internet. Previously, customer-specified orders went to the end of the manufacturing queue, which is why lead times were so long. Dealers were unable to specify the mix of inventory they wanted. Instead, GM 'pushed' inventory to the dealers. With the new VOM system, dealers placed orders for the vehicles they want on a weekly and daily basis and could see the status of those orders as they moved through the order-fulfilment process. Using the new system, dealer orders were automatically compared with the current manufacturing schedule. In the past, GM often built the 'right' vehicles but sent them to the 'wrong' dealers because there was no mechanism in place for matching production with demand. Now GM did its best to make sure that dealers got the vehicles they wanted. To speed order delivery, the new process looked for the fastest way to fill orders. Is a desired vehicle already in production? Scheduled for assembly? Available at another dealer's lot? Close enough to a vehicle currently in production that a few adjustments will seal the deal? Orders were viewed daily, and assembly schedules were adjusted accordingly. When desired options are constrained by parts availability, those constraints were systematically flagged, analysed, and minimised through a new constraint-elimination process. Strategic parts buffering has been a useful new approach to minimising parts shortages (and order constraints); a new tool had been implemented that enabled GM to stock up on select parts and materials that were potential bottlenecks. Getting the right part to the right operator in the plant at the right time is critical. With better supply chain visibility and a focus on strategic parts buffering, GM has been able to improve parts availability overall, boosting quality and cutting costs. Although demand forecasts still drove production - long lead times for certain materials made this the most practical approach - GM now balanced its traditional build-to-stock model with more build to order to lower inventory levels throughout the distribution chain and better respond to 3 customer needs. The company now accepted new orders on a daily basis and could schedule them for the assembly plant the same day and had them come off the line in the same week. As a result of these changes, lead times for special orders and dealer-replenishment orders improved by 60 percent, and customer surveys showed that GM customers received their vehicles eight days faster than vehicles from competitors. Delivery reliability had also improved dramatically. Today, GM met its delivery date commitments 90 percent of the time. Now recognised as one of the most reliable suppliers to the commercial fleet market, GM recently received Fleet Magazine's Best Order to Delivery Fleet Company award for the second consecutive year. And since production better matches demand, customers had a greater probability of receiving their first-choice vehicle. Orders affected by constraints had been reduced by over 90 percent. GM received its best-ever National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) survey results for OTD/distribution elements for allocation system, product availability, and timeliness of delivery. And it realised higher margins on vehicles that were built to customer order. A NEW ORGANISATION One of the greatest obstacles to transforming GM's OTD organisation into one that would be customer driven was the company's functional 'silos'. Too often different groups worked at crosspurposes rather than together. This led to finger pointing and an added layer of complexity while boosting schedule changes and increasing parts shortages, causing unnecessarily high inventory levels and carrying costs. GM created a global cross-functional OTD organisation to ensure that operating objectives were aligned and to eliminate competition for resources. It was organised around GM's three core supply chain sub-processes: supply operations, order fulfilment, and logistics. Order fulfillment dealt with dealer-facing and planning activities; supply operations managed materials, internal plant activities, and supplier interaction, and logistics coordinated the movement of parts inbound from the suppliers to the assembly plant and outbound transportation of vehicles to the dealer. Each of these sub-processes was run by a global leader. Together, the three leaders formed a global leadership team that drove the OTD transformation. The new organisation co-locates the people who support each other and depend on each other for information. Supply operations was aligned within manufacturing, for instance. Likewise, order fulfilment was embedded within sales and marketing. Outbound logistics was co-located with order fulfilment and inbound logistics with supply operations. In the old organisation, GM had two order-management groups. Vehicle order management reported to sales and marketing, production order management reported to production control and logistics. The OTD team realised that only one order-management process was needed. Accordingly, both processes were combined under OTD within sales and marketing. (See Session 3 for more detail on designing processes first and then realigning organisational structure to empower the processes.) When the dust had settled, GM was able to cut back on the number of people needed to run the global OTD organisation by nearly 30 percent, achieving far greater efficiency and a major reduction in costs. RETHINKING LOGISTICS In seeking ways to further streamline the OTD organisation and cut costs, GM realised that logistics were a weak link. The company had long outsourced inbound and outbound logistics activities to a network of third-party service providers at a high cost. However, a lack of communication and coordination among the providers led to inconsistent performance and long lead times. To reduce costs and improve efficiency, GM partnered with a global logistics company to create the joint venture Vector SCM. Today, Vector centrally managed GM's large, complex logistics network through a series of command centers equipped with the technology needed to track GM's assets and carriers. To further improve performance and visibility, Vector created one integrated information system for the third-party service providers. By improving logistics, GM's goal was to 4 reduce costs by 20 percent in five years. By year three, GM had already achieved cost savings of 17 percent. The logistics team also sought to further cut costs by minimising in-transit damage. Vehicles are treated as 'jewels' in the auto industry, and consumers wanted their jewels delivered unscratched, undented, and 'polished'. By streamlining the route from assembly plant to dealer and minimising vehicle handling, GM reduced vehicle damage incidents by 35 percent. A FOCUS ON BUSINESS RESULTS Throughout the OTD transformation, GM maintained a rigorous focus on business results. Because the initiative was so ambitious - with so many improvement opportunities - the company risked losing sight of the big picture while chasing down avenues with limited value-add. GM chose four key metrics to guide the transformation: quality, net income, cash conservation, and market share. Every initiative and every decision had to support one or more of these metrics. The primary drivers of quality were fewer vehicle damage incidents and providing parts to the assembly line on time to support the build plan. Lower costs and fewer constraints boosted net income. Lower inventory levels helped to conserve cash. The OTD initiative systematically addressed each of these areas. The final metric - market share - was selected as the way in which customer satisfaction improvements could be translated into improved company performance. The drivers of customer satisfaction that OTD could influence were order lead time, delivery-date promise reliability, and vehicle-of-choice availability. By improving these drivers, GM would boost customer satisfaction. This would be good for business because satisfied customers bought more products. These four business-focused metrics were a focal point for the transformation, driving the change forward by forcing the organisation to keep its eyes on the road. Notes Ross, 'We were always able to map the improvement initiatives to these objectives'. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE Although the primary focus of GM's transformation effort in the early stages was on redesigning the key processes and organisation, GM could not have transformed its OTD capability without addressing the company's underlying information systems. Like most large, complex organisations, GM had a tangle of legacy systems - many redundant - and a lack of integration across functions, business units, and geographies. Since most off-the-shelf software required significant customisation, many of the legacy systems and applications were developed by or for GM and were specifically designed to manage the company's high degree of product and process complexity. GM was in the process of moving many of its legacy systems to the Internet, but a high-performance, wholly integrated IT environment remained a vision that will take many years to achieve. In the meantime, GM was working with what it had. Given the scope of the effort, the OTD team had to prioritise the needed capabilities and then find technology solutions that did not cost too much or take too long to implement. The team's strategy had been to enhance key legacy systems with Web-enabled tools and integration, incorporating new tools selectively. Bill Kala, director of North American manufacturing supply operations and part of the original OTD leadership team, credits GM's global materials scheduling system - a legacy system dating back to the 1980s - with driving many of the savings in supply operations. Kala realised early on, however, that he had to rein in enhancement and maintenance costs. As he explains, \"Everyone wanted to make frequent changes to the system, and those changes were contributing to a $70 million annual spend\". To gain control, Kala stipulated that any changes be clearly explained and justified. Moreover, changes had to benefit at least two geographic regions. Any request for a new stand-alone system was scrutinised carefully. The result? Kala's group cut the annual cost of the system by almost 30 percent. In some areas, GM had to push IT changes faster than planned to improve partner collaboration. GM's Information Systems Group supported a move to better integrate the company's processes and systems with those of GM's dealers at the point of sale. Until then, integration had been limited to the basics - parts ordering or submission of warranty claims and financial reports. GM also piloted a 5 program that deployed one personal computer (PC) for every two service bays at dealer locations to support integration between service and parts and GM. Early tests at Saturn had shown that GM could centrally manage parts inventory at the store level with this system, increasing inventory turns and first-time fill rates and lowering retail inventory levels. GM's IT strategy was working. The company had taken an additional $1 billion out of IT expenses related to the supply chain since the OTD initiative was launched. The focus on process first and technology second has had a bonus effect. Explains John Whitcomb, GM director of global sales, service, and marketing, \"Once people have a common understanding of business process, which is manifested by the workflow, the discussion about legacy components becomes much more fact-based. You remove the emotional arguments about keeping those systems which people have grown comfortable with\". THE NEXT FRONTIER What's next for GM's OTD transformation? Reduced cycle times and lead times. More personalised vehicles with special accessories and features. Better integration with dealers, who have already embraced the VOM system and several other Web-based tools that were being built into an integrated 'workbench'. GM was also looking at more build to order through the dealer channel, which is valuable for its high-touch, high-tech capabilities, and a more flexible supply base. It was looking at more commonality among global systems and processes. 'There really is no end point to an initiative like this', says Ross. \"We expect to continue on this improvement trajectory for the next several years, providing more competitive advantage for GM - and setting new standards for customer satisfaction\". Questions: 1. Identify the problem(s) faced by General Motors (GM). (Marks 20) 2. What was the business strategy adopted by GM in addressing its problem(s)? (Marks 10) 3. Discuss how GM used performance measurement and performance management to improve its operational and financial performance. (Marks 70) 6