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II.3 Consider the dynamic game that consists on playing the following prisoners dilemma on a first stage: Player B C N Player A C -4, -4 -1 ,-5 N -5 , -1 -2,-2 Then, in stage 2, the same players play the following "choice of standards" game after observing what they played at stage 1 and after collecting the respective payoffs: Player B CN Player A C 3,3 0,0 N 0,0 1,1 (a) (2 points) Find the stage Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the two different games above. (b) (9 points) Find the minimum discount rate & such that there exists a SPNE in which players play (N, N) in the first period. For this question, restrict attention to pure strategies. (c) (9 points) Answer question (b) in the case in which we allow for mixed strategies