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Little Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Big Brew High Price Low Price Enter $2 million, $3 million -$1 million, $1 million Little Kona Don't Enter $0. $7 million $0, $2 million True or False: Both Little Kona and Big Brew have a dominant strategy in this game. True False Which of the following outcomes represent a Nash equilibrium in this case? Check all that apply. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. - Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. - Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters. - Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, \"If you enter, we're going to set a low price, so you had better stay out.\" True or False: Little Kona should not believe the threat. True False If the two rms could collude and agree on how to split the total prots, what outcome would they pick? Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a high price and Little Kona enters. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona does not enter. Big Brew maintains a low price and Little Kona enters