https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/918/517/24304/

In August 1979, Vaughn, a black female attorney, became an associate contract analyst in Texaco's Land Department. Her supervisors were Edel and Alvin Earl Hatton, assistant chief contract analyst. In Vaughn's early years with Texaco she was promoted first to contract analyst and then to petroleum contract analyst. During this period she was the "highest ranked contract analyst" in the department.

The events leading to this dispute began on April 16, 1985, the day after Vaughn had returned from a second maternity leave. On that day, Edel complained to Vaughn about the low volume of her prior work and the excessive number of people who had visited her office. Vaughn later spoke to Keller about Edel's criticism. In a memorandum concerning this discussion, Keller wrote that he had told Vaughn that he had been told that Vaughn's productivity "was very low"; that he "had become aware for some time of the excessive visiting by predominantly blacks in her office behind closed doors"; and that "the visiting had a direct bearing on her productivity." Keller then told Vaughn, as he noted in his memo, that "she was allowing herself to become a black matriarch within Texaco" and "that this role was preventing her from doing her primary work for the Company and that it must stop."

Keller's remarks offended Vaughn, so she sought the advice of a friend who was an attorney in Texaco's Legal Department. Keller learned of this meeting and of Vaughn's belief that he was prejudiced. To avoid charges of race discrimination, Keller, as he later testified, told Edel "not [to] have any confrontations with Ms. Vaughn about her work." Keller added that "If he [Edel] was dissatisfied, let it ride. If it got serious, then see Keller."

Between April 1985 and April 1987 when Vaughn was fired, neither Edel nor Hatton expressed criticism of Vaughn's work to her. During this period all annual written evaluations of Vaughn's performance (which, incidentally, Vaughn never saw) were "satisfactory." Vaughn also received a merit salary increase, albeit the minimum, for 1986. Keller testified that for several years he had intentionally overstated on Vaughn's annual evaluations his satisfaction with her performance because he did not have the time to spend going through the procedures which would result from a lower "rating" and which could lead to termination.

In 1985-86 Texaco undertook a study to identify activities it could eliminate to save costs. To meet the cost-reduction goal set by that study, the Land Department fired its two "poorest performers," one of whom was Vaughn, as the "lowest ranked" contract analyst; the other was a white male.

In passing Title VII, Congress announced that "sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees."

When direct credible evidence of employer discrimination exists, such as a statement or written document showing discriminatory motive on its face, employers can counter "only by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have acted as they did without regard to the plaintiff's race."

Vaughn presented direct evidence of discrimination. Keller testified that to avoid provoking a discrimination suit he had told Vaughn's supervisors not to confront her about her work. His "black matriarch" memorandum details the events that led Keller to initiate this policy. Keller also testified that he had deliberately overstated Vaughn's evaluations in order not to start the process that might eventually lead to termination. This direct evidence clearly shows that Keller acted as he did solely because Vaughn is black.

Although Vaughn's race may not have directly motivated the 1987 decision to fire her, race did play a part, as the magistrate found, in Vaughn's employment relationship with Texaco from 1985 to 1987. Texaco's treatment of Vaughn was not color-blind during that period. In neither criticizing Vaughn when her work was unsatisfactory nor counselling her how to improve, Texaco treated Vaughn differently than it did its other contract analysts because, as the magistrate found, she was black. As a result, Texaco did not afford Vaughn the same opportunity to improve her performance, and perhaps her relative ranking, as it did its white employees. One of those employees was placed on an improvement program. As for the others, Texaco does not deny that they received, at least, informal counselling. The evidence indicates that Vaughn had the ability to improve. As Texaco acknowledges, she was once its "highest ranked contract analyst."

Had her dissatisfied supervisors simply counselled Vaughn informally, such counselling would inevitably have indicated to Vaughn that her work was deficient. Had Keller given Vaughn the evaluation that he believed she deserved, Texaco's regulations would have required his placing her on a ninety-day work improvement program, just as at least one other employee--a white male--had been placed. A Texaco employee who has not improved by the end of that period is fired.

When an employer excludes black employees from its efforts to improve efficiency, it subverts the "broad overriding interest" of Title VII--"efficient and trusty workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions."

The decisions not to apply the usual procedures in Vaughn's case were racial decisions. Texaco has never stated any reason other than that she was black for treating Vaughn as it did. Had Texaco treated Vaughn in a color-blind manner from 1985 to 1987, Vaughn might have been fired by April 1987 for unsatisfactory work; on the other hand, she might have sufficiently improved her performance so as not to be one of the two "lowest ranked" employees, thereby avoiding termination in April 1987.

Because Texaco's behavior was race-motivated, Texaco has violated Title VII. Texaco limited or classified Vaughn in a way which would either "tend to deprive [her] of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee." Texaco has also "otherwise" discriminated against Vaughn with respect to her "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."

• How was Vaughn's employment negatively affected due to the actions of her supervisors?
• Based on your reading of the case, do you believe race played a role in the manager's behavior? Explain your reasoning
• Should the court have instead sided with Texaco since they stated they fired her for performance reasons rather than racial discrimination? Explain your reasoning
• If you were Vaughn's manager in this situation, how would you have handled things differently?