HW help, thank you!

Levi Strauss and Wrangler are planning new generation jeans and must decide on the colors for their products. The possible colors are white, black, and violet. The payoff to each firm depends on the color it chooses and the color choosen by its rival, as the profit matrix to the right shows. Levi Strauss Given that the firms move simultaneously, identify any dominant strategies in this game and find any pure Nash White Black Violet equilibria. 50 150 200 O A. Levi Strauss's dominant strategy is to pick black but Wrangler does not have a dominant strategy. White O B. Levi Strauss does not have a dominant strategy but Wrangler's dominant strategy is to pick violet. 50 100 150 O C. Levi Strauss's dominant strategy is to pick violet but Wrangler does not have a dominant strategy. Wrangler 100 0 175 O D. Levi Strauss and Wrangler do not have dominant strategies. Black O E. Levi Strauss does not have a dominant strategy but Wrangler's dominant strategy is to pick white. 150 0 75 75 O A. The Nash equilibria are for Levi Strauss to pick violet and Wrangler to pick white and for Levi Strauss to 100 pick white and Wrangler to pick violet. Violet O B. The game has no pure Nash equilibria. 200 175 0 O C. The Nash equilibria are for Levi Strauss to pick violet and Wrangler to pick white and for Levi Strauss to pick black and Wrangler to pick violet. O D. The Nash equilibria are for Levi Strauss to pick violet and Wrangler to pick black and for Levi Strauss to pick black and Wrangler to pick violet. O E. The Nash equilibrium is for Levi Strauss to pick white and Wrangler to pick white. Now suppose the firms move sequentially, with Wrangler moving first. Identify any subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this sequential move game