I already know that q1=q2=3, I want to get detailed answers to question b and c

II Consider a Cournot duopoly. Both firms have the same constant marginal Cost c Time jnve demand function of the market is given by P = 10 Q, price, and Q is the aggregate OutpUt. tq gme jncluding firm out- (a) Solve for the Nash equili r puts, market profits. [20] game. In stage 1, (b) Now suppose these tw Ir they produce equal to the Nash It impossible selll rn I e here we, assume lif rove that it IS a Bj ?ubgrpf each firm charges t e! [151 (C) This part continues from part (b). Prove that each firm charges the market clearing price 10 QI (72, for i 1, 2, is the [151 unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.