I have solved questions 2 and 3, but I need help with question number 4 only. Thank you!

2. Two competing firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, are selling a homogeneous good. The demand curve they face is P=125Q, where Q=q1+q2. Each has the same marginal cost of $25. Both are seeking to maximize profits and are setting quantities simultaneously. a) If both of these firms agree to act as a monopoly, what quantity would they produce and what price would they sell the good at? b) If the firms split the monopoly profit equally, how much would each firm receive? c) Do either of the firm's have an incentive to cheat on this agreement? Explain. d) Find the Cournot equilibrium. e) How does the total quantity produced under the Cournot compare to the monopoly? Explain. 3. From above now assume Firm 1 is the price leader and sets quantity before Firm 2. a) What is the Stackelberg equilibrium? b) How does this differ from the Cournout equilibrium? Explain. c) Now suppose the only way Firm 1 can become the price leader is if they invest in a new technology to reduce their marginal cost to $15. What would be the maximum that Firm 1 would pay? (Think about what profit you need to compare the price leadership profit with.) 4. Now suppose instead of the firms competing on quantity they compete on price. a) What is the equilibrium price and quantity? b) What is different about the Cournot and Bertrand equilibriums, and what does this mean for firm's profits? c) If each firm can supply a maximum of 50 , and both have the same marginal cost of $25, what is the equilibrium