I mversity of Arizona Professor Dufwenberg Department of Economics Fall 2019 Butwenberg. Kohlin, Martinsson & Medhin ("Thanks but No Thanks") study this game form: D 0 2 3 D 1 1, I1 11, 11 10, 11 11, 11 0 11, 11 11, 11 11. 11 0,0 11, 11 0. 8 0, 16 0, 24 0, 32 11, 11 8,0 8. 8 8, 16 8, 24 2, 26 16, 0 16, 8 4, 20 3 16, 16 10, 18 11, 11 24,0 24. 8 18, 10 12, 12 6, 14 4 11, 11 32, 0 26, 2 20, 4 14. 6 8, 8 ( Suppose the players are selfish. Find a dominant strategy in the resulting game (circle the matching strategy in the above matrix!) and explain why it is a dominant strategy. In paint . O is weakly donated strategy by 1. is . . byz 1 .s weatly dominated string by _ 7. -- 12is - by , 3 2 2 by 4 . 9. piece 4 and player14 is weably 5 . for payer ). 0 Is weably dominated strategy by I dow rated strategy my MayerID and! (ii) Suppose the players have maximin utility (=min(x,v), when one player gets x and the other y). Re- draw the above game form such that it becomes the game in which such maximin utility is reflected. Then explain which strategies survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in that game. V 2 3 So just survive the strategy 11, 11 profile ( D. D). So CAD ) 0.5 0.0 90 010 is dominant strategy 8, 9 2.2 1. 11 0 0 1 1 0,0 71 10 10 12.12 6 6 2 2. 1 1/ | 90 / 2,2 4 , 4 6.6 4 1 8 11. 11 2 for player 1 . o is weably dominated strategiesby ,. for player I, 1 is . -. for - - - 1, 4is . _ _ . by 2. - - by'D is the strategies survive for player 2, 0 is weably dominated strategies byl for . . . . 2. 1 is . - - -by 2 iterated elinmation of for -. . . 2, 4 is . . . . - - weply dominated strategies by D In theit gaine. 10