I need crest analysis on this case Not SWOT.

no I just need CREST ANALYSIS on this case if you need more information I can send it to you

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In the fall of 2020, partners Jennie O'Keefe and Chris Johnson contemplated the future of their newly opened craft brewery, Rough Waters Brewing Company (RWBC), in Deer Lake, Newfoundland and Labrador. The business had lived up to its name since the sale of its first pint a year earlier, and was certainly was not in the position the owners had expected after their first year of operation. To say that 2020 had been an eventful year did not nearly capture the degree of uncertainty and sense of urgency the entrepreneurs now felt in facing some critical decisions about the future of their brewery. RWBC had launched in November 2019. By March 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic had arrived at the doorstep of the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador, resulting in a temporary but complete closure of non-essential businesses and a shutdown of the free movement of people into the province. . While pandemic-related restrictions had eased somewhat through the warmer months of June, July, and August, September saw new challenges that impacted RWBC's sales and distribution plans and the way the business engaged with the public. According to O 'Keefe, it was getting more difficult to grow sales in key markets, the business was highly seasonal, and the workdays were often over twelve hours long. Add to that a struggling provincial economy, and suddenly the dream of owning and operating a craft brewery was feeling much more overwhelming and complicated than it had seemed at the start. The entrepreneurs were eager to identify the best way to achieve stronger growth and market positioning for RWBC. They felt there was no time to lose in identifying a business focus that would enable RWBC to iterate and chart a smooth course. While they could identify several,possibilities, O'Keefe and Johnson recognized that they did not have the time, money, expertise, or information to address or explore all of them at once. They had to determine the best possible courses of action, figure out how to evaluate the possibilities, and identify the most strategic way forward for business growth. A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT The Provincial Craft Brewing Industry Craft beer referred to any "beer made by a brewer that is small, independent, and traditional." With eighteen craft breweries on the island of Newfoundland and a single brewery on the mainland of Labrador, the craft brewing industry employed approximately 300 people in the province. 3 Between 2016 and 2019 , a "craft beer boom" had seen twelve breweries open to service the province's market of roughly half a million people." RWBC was among the newest additions to the scene 5 (see Exhibit 1 for a comparison of the province's microbreweries on several different variables). Many provincial craft breweries had taken a community-based approach to their marketing and engagement. For instance, Dildo Brewing Company and Museum was opened in the museum in the town of Dildo in part to permit the museum to remain open and maintain historical and cultural connections important to its community, other breweries had also chosen to locatefin restored historic spaces to give them a new purpose. 6 Most brewery owners acknowledged the signifit ant support they had experienced from their own communities in opening and operating their businesses.? Supporting social causes was also relatively common throughout the provincial craft brewing scene, as in the case of the Port Rexton Brewery Company, which promoted support for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and others (LGBTQ+) community by hosting the Port Rexton Pride festival in 20183 Breweries were also stepping up on the environmental front. Like RWBC's own efforts to minimize any negative environmental impact, Boomstick Brewing Company aimed to reduce its own footprint by replacing carbon dioxide with nitrogen. Unique Connections Throughout the province, craft breweries provided a high degree of support to each other and worked collectively to strengthen and promote the broader craft beer industry: 10 The sense shared by many brewers was that they were not actually competitors, but rather people who shared a love for the craft brewing industry and the province, and a desire to help sustain rural communities by creating jobs and attracting tourists." O Keefe and Johnson had spoken of this same experience with "competitors." As O' Keefe said of their olwn recent experience, "Honestly, we truly are all friends ... we were waiting on our grain order last week and we called [another brewery in the area] and they were like, 'Yeah, you can borrow this and then when your order comes in then just replace it.' Right? Perfect! So, we honestly do work together." The way 0 Keefe saw the industy was that the small brewers did not want to compete against one another over such a tiny share of the orerall beer markat. As she put it, "Breweries don't want to fight over 2 per cent of the market. If you want to fight, you know, fight [big beer corporations] with the 98 per cent of the market, because we 'il all die if we fight orer the 2 per cent." That said, RIVBC's owners aclnowledged that the industry was getting more crowded and competitive, which was making it more challenging to sell beer. The Newfoundland Labrador Liquor Corporation The Newfoundland Labrador Liquor Corporation (NLC) was the provincial retail and regulating body for the sale of alcohol throughout the province. It featured all categories of beer, wine, and spirits and operated two major lines of business related to the sale of craft beer: retail sales and wholesale distribution. RWBC's brews were available through several retail locations owned and managed by the NLC. Through its thirty-one corporately owned retail stores, NLC sales totalled CA. $262.413 in 2019 , making it the largest purchaser and retailer of beer in the province. 14 With its wholesale business supplying 146 Liquor Express locations and over 1,400 licensees, these two types of distribution accounted for 29 per cent and 6 per cent of NLC3 sales, respectively. Page 3 W27802 Local beer sales throughout Newfoundland and Labrador had been steady over the preceding five years, averaging 3.5 million litres per year. 6 It would be difficult to ignore such high sales volumes and not consider the potential implications for a small cratt brewery: retailing in NLC locations could provide unparalleled market reach. It had to be noted, however, that the province's craft beers fell into NLC's category of local beer, a category that also included all other Canadian-produced beer (both craft and noncraft). While the NLC provided impressive access to the market for the brewers who were successful in gaining access to the retailer, once you were in the NLC, it was an even greater challenge to stand out against the sea of competing beer products on the shelves. Govermment Taxes and Price Setting The NLC also regulated taxes on the gale of alcohol in the province. According to many of the small brewers throughout Newfoundland and Labrador, the provincial government had strict and outdated tax rates and regulations for craft breweries. In the fall of 2020, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador reduced tax rates for these breweries. 17 Previously, a microbrewery like RWBC that produced under 100,000 litres per year would have received $2.70 after taxes for a can of beer selling for $4.00 retail; the reduction in tax rates meant that the amount a brewer would keep after taxes had grown to $3.15. The increased margin came from a $0.45 cut in the NLC taxes. Although the slightly reduced tax rate was a welcome signal from the provincial government, according to O'Keefe and Johnson, the tax rate in Newfoundland and Labrador was still much higher than in the rest of Canada 18 Of course, it remained unknown if margins for brewers would increase in the future. Price setting was also an issue. Businesses worked with the NLC to set a single price for their products. Once set, regardless of where the beer was purchased - a NLC retail location or directly from a taproomconsumers would pay the same price for a beer. 10O 'Keefe explained: "So our beer is $5.50 - it is at our shop, as well as NLC locations, as well as convenience stores. Depending on where you get it, we have to pay more fees for that beer [e.g., to account for distribution costs], so we make less money if it's at a convenience store or the NLC, and we get more profit if we sell it in-house. ,20 Because the breweries could not charge a higher price to consumers to offset the additional costs associated with selling through the NLC distribution channels, this cut into their already narrow profit margin. O'Keefe continued, "[This] really cuts into us being able to grow, because obviously we would really love to have our beer at every single NLC [location] across the province because there should be more craft beer and local options available to everyone no matter where you are. But to do that is actually really expensive for craft breweries and especially small breweries like us ... and I don't think people necessarily realize that. .I: An Uncertain Economic Outlook Despite experiencing a degree of early business success and local support for RWBC, the business owners could not ignore the state of Newfoundland and Labrador's overall economy; many key indicators painted a mixed and troubled picture..2 The province's population was 521,364 and declining. 23 Unemployment had risen from 12.3 per cent to 14.1 per cent from 2019 to 2020, and Newfoundland and Labrador censistently had the highest level of debt per capita - at $29,326 in 2019 - of any Canadian province. 24 There twere some positive indicators: between 2007 and 2017 , the average household income increased by 18 per cent from 569,300 to 581,500 ; retail sales in food and beverage increased by 5.9 per cent in 2020 : and the average annual household expenditure for alcohol stood at $1,029, compared to $757 for the rest of Canada in 2017-18. 23 However, any future business decisions made by O' Keefe and Johnson would need to acknowledge the realities of the province's unsettled economic state. Page 4 W27802 The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be ignored, but they were still relatively unknown. O'Keefe and Johnson knew they might not have much support from the govemment because they were still a very small and very new company. On a federal level, for example, although the supports that had been made available to Canadian small businesses on account of the pandemic had been widely publicized, RWBC did not meet the payroll requirements to access this funding since it had no employees. 26 As O'Keefe explained in an interview, "We only opened in December, so we didn't have a payroll! We have good relationships with our local MP [Member of Parliament] and MHA [Member of the House of Assembly] and are hopeful for a resolution soon; otherwise, it's not going to end well for us.,"27 Navigating the red tape of business' support in this environment was beyond the owners' direct control, but it did pose a challenge to if or how well the brewery could survive through and beyond pandemic times. crest analysis on this case