I need help with both but Question 22 the most.

QUESTION 21 Consider a simple game theoretic version of "cops and robbers". In this game, there will be a cop (Player 1), and a robber (Player 2). The cop will choose a level of effort (91) in order to catch the robber, and the robber will choose a level of effort (e2) used to commit crimes. The best responses will work as follows: The higher the level of effort e2 ofthe robber, the more effort e'l the cop will want to exert to catch himfher Alternatively, the higher the level of effort e1 exerted by the cop, the less effort the robber will be willing to commit to crime. One example of best responses which we'll use to capture this intuition will be the following: 91 = 25 + 92 e2 2 75 e1. What would the graph of these best responses look like? _A92 Bee; el=25+ez el=25+82 75- 25. 92:7581 25 75 e] 75 2'5 91 =25+ez 82:7581 93:75-91 25 81 =25+92 75 91 QUESTION 22 Consider the cops and robbers game mentioned in the problem above. What are the equilibrium levels of effort for each player? {Please round you answers to the nearest whole numbers, so that you answer contains no decimals)