i need help with the following

02(30): Consider a two-player game where the player A chooses \"up" or "down" and player B chooses "left" or \"right\" Their payoffs are as follows: When player A chooses \"up" and player B chooses \"left" they both get $4. When player A chooses \"up" and player B chooses \"right\" they get $3 (for A) and $5 (for B}. When player A chooses "down" and player B chooses \"left" they get $2 (for A) and $7 (for B). Finally, when player A chooses "down" and player B chooses "right" they both get $6. The two players decide simultaneously. a) Draw the table of the game. Is there any dominant strategy? Justify your answer. b) Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Justify your answer. c) Find the mixed strategies Nash Equilibrium if each player randomizes over his actions. d) Show graphically the best response functions and the Nash Equilibria