I solved first question, could you please solve the rest?

Problem PS7.2.1 iii point {graded} In lecture we saw the Cournot competition model for two firms with the same cost function. Now, we are going to consider asymmetric cost functions. Assume that demand for a good is given by p = a de [Qd is quantity demanded], and that there are 2 firms competing in quantities. Both have no fixed costs and a constant marginal cost. Firm 1 has a marginal cost (:1, and firm 2 has a marginal cost (:2. We have that a > 01 > (:2. Find the reaction functions of firms 1 and 2 in this market: how the optimal quantityr produced depends on the quantity produced by the other firm. To verify that you have found the correct reaction functions, compute the optimal ql if {12 = 100, a = 4, b = 0.01, cl = 2, and 02 = 1. [Note that this is not necessarily an equilibrium.) t1'1: - Solve for the quantity produced by each firm and the equilibrium price. To verify that you have found the correct equilibrium, compute qi', q2', and 33' if a = 4, b = 0.01.01 2 2, and (:2 = 1. I '11 Find the equilibrium price and the quantity produced by each firm if they compete in prices (Bertrand competition). {Assume the parameters given above.) 13 is close to what value? 0 (:1 O None of the above 0 62 O '31\"? 2 Ol] (31 is close to what value? O l] 0 None of the above ncl >a O O cl O q? is close to what value? 0 None of the above OI] Problem PS7.2.3b 1 point possible {graded} How does this equilibrium compare to the perfectly competitive case [if firms sold at their marginal cost as though they faced perfect competition}? 0 Bertrand competition results in an efficiency gain relative to perfect competition 0 Bertrand competition results in an efficiency loss relative to perfect competition Submit You have used 0 of 'I attempt 35"\" Problem PS7.2.4 1 point possible {graded} Now, let's go back to the case where all firms have the same cost function. In class we savvI the Cournot competition model for two firms. Now. we are going to get you through the Cournot model with three firms. Assume that demand for a good is given by p = a 562\". and that there are 3firms competing in quantity with a constant marginal cost 6