I will attach my question.

3. Consider a continuous time game where the time variable starts at I] and runs inde- nitely. There are two players denoted by i and j. Assume that the value party i attaches to the object in dispute is tr.- 3 El and the value it attaches to a 5W5 chance of obtaining the object is trif'l Each unit of time that passes before the dispute is settled {i.e_ one of the parties concedes} costs each party one unit of payoff. Thus if player i concedes rst, at time t\" her payolf is t.- [she spends t.- units of time and does not obtain the object}. If the other player concedes lirst1 at time t\" player \"E's payoff is o.- if [she obtains the object after it} units of time}. If both players concede at the same time, player ails payoff is \"HI-fl t.- 1where t.- is the common concession time. {a} writ-E dovm the players: payoff functions, derive their best responses and explain the intuition for the shape of the best response functions. {b} Illustrate player is payoff function for various values of tj- in appropriate diagrams. {c} Derive Nash equilibria and explain your results