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I would like to know the answer for No. 4 in particular. p = 0, profit = 0 price = 10, profit = 50 delta

I would like to know the answer for No. 4 in particular.

  1. p = 0, profit = 0
  2. price = 10, profit = 50
  3. delta > 1/2
  4. delta > 25/34 (not sure)

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1 Problem 1 Two firms - firm 1 and firm 2 - share a market for a specific product. Both have zero marginal cost. They compete in the manner of Bertrand and the market demand for the product is given by: q = 20 - min {p1, p2}. 1. What are the equilibrium prices and profits? 2. Suppose the two firms have signed a collusion contract, that is, they agree to set the same price and share the market equally. What is the price they would set and what would be their profits? For the following parts, suppose the Bertrand game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both firms d E [0, 1). 3. Let both players adopt the following strategy: start with collusion; maintain the collusive price as long as no one has ever deviated before; otherwise set the Bertrand price. What is the minimum value of d for which this is a SPNE. 4. Suppose the policy maker has imposed a price floor p = 4, that is, neither firm is allowed to set a price below $4. How does your answer to part 3 change? Is it now larger or smaller? Explain

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