IConsider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the rst play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the gamesJ as be cc 4: A 3,24; 5,2; 1,1143 B 2,6; 4,4; 1,3443 C 1,24: 0,2; 2,343 Tis not known. Instead, we know that the game continues with probability 5 and ends with probability 1 6 after each roundwii eachplayergetljng zero if thegame ends (or, if you prefer, E is the discount ftr.+' [a] [15%) Is it possible to play (51 b) in each period if 5 = 0.82% Lb) {1096mm if d = 0.21%