If you are playing a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with me for 100 rounds and after 20 rounds you are certain that I am playing "tit for tat" then Then the best you can do is make as much as I do Then the best you can do is also play "tit for tat" Then you can obtain a higher pay-off than l in a direct comparison Then your pay-off will always be lower than mine Question 18 0/1 pts Consider a monopolist who is practicing perfect price discrimination. Then The output level will be above, below, or the same as the efficient level, depending on the overall elasticity of demand. The output ievel is below the efficient fevel: The output level is the same that would be attained in a competitive market. The output level is above the efficient level Backward induction in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game is A strategy that helps to maximize profits A method to calculate the Nash equilibrium A strategy that helps a player to get higher profit than the owner None of the above or below Question 8 0/1 pts Which one is NOT a consequence of static pricing? The emergence of a secondary market Constant prices in the secondary market The event will be sold out None of the above or below In the model of Mickey Mouse pricing with two different consumers, one with small demand and one with large demand, increasing the price above marginal cost, (all relative to the case where price is equal to marginal cost) Increases revenue from the small consumer and decreases revenue from the large consumer Increases revenue from the small consumer and increases revenue from the large consumer Decreases revenue from the small consumer and increases revenue from the large consumer Decreises revenue from the small consumer and decreases revenue from the latge: constrmer In the model of Mickey Mouse pricing with two types of consumers, one with small demand and one with large demand, the price is Equal to marginal cost Above marginal cost Equal to consumer surplus Below marginal cost Question 4 0/1 pts In the model of Mickey Mouse pricing with two different consumers, one with small demand and one with large demand, let CSL denote consumer surplus of the large consumer and CSS denote consumer surplus of the small consumer. Let F denote the entry fee. Then we have F=CSLcssF=css+CSLF=cssF=CSL