I'm not sure how to answer these questions. Can someone help? Thank you

a. Summit follows a tit-for-tat strategy: It chooses the collusive price in the first period and in each later period chooses whichever action (collude or defect) that Outreach chose in the previous period. Create an Excel spreadsheet that shows Outreach's profit on a period by period basis as follows. Column A shows the time periods. Enter 1 in cell A35, 2 in cell A36 and so on up to 5 in cell A39. In cells B34 to F34 enter the column titles Strategy 1, ..., Strategy 5. In column B, enter Outreach's profit each period if it chooses the collusive price each period. In Column C, assume that Outreach defects in each period. In Column D, assume that Outreach defects in the first period then plays the collusive price in each subsequent period. In Column E, assume that Outreach colludes for the first 4 periods then defects in the last period. In column F, assume that Outreach plays a tit-for-tat strategy. If Outreach wants to maximize its combined profit over all 5 periods, which of the 5 strategies is the best response to Summit's tit-for-tat strategy? Which is the worst? Outreach's profits Time Period Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 1 6 9 9 6 6 6 6 3 6 3 6 6 6 4 6 3 6 6 6 5 6 3 6 9 6 otal Profit 30 21 28 33 30 If Outreach wants to maximize its combined profit over all 5 periods, which of the 5 strategies is the best response to Summit's tit-for-tat strategy? Which is the worst?b. Is the combination of strategies identified in part a (the tit-for-tat strategy by Summit and the best response by Outreach) a Nash equilibrium? (Hint: Create a new block of entries in your spreadsheet in which you assume that Outreach chooses the best response determined in part a. Enter the profits earned by Summit if it uses the tit-for-tat strategy and see if you can find a strategy that yields a higher cumulative profit for Summit over the 5 periods.) Consider the following strategies for Summit: Strategy 1: Defect in period 1 and charge collusive price in all other periods. Strategy 2: Defect in period 2 and charge collusive price in all other periods. Strategy 3: Tit-for Tat. Summit's profits given Outreach's best response, strategy 4 (from part (a) Time period Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Tit-for Tat Can you find a strategy that yields a higher cumulative 1 9 6 6 profit for Summit over the 5 periods? 6 9 6 3 6 6 6 4 6 6 6 5 1 1 1 Total profit 28 28 25 Is the combination of strategies identified in part a (the tit- for-tat strategy by Summit and the best response by Outreach) a Nash equilibrium?Outreach Explorations and Summit Adventures are the only two vacation adventure companies operating in a national park. The adventure experiences they offer are very similar and they compete using their prices. Each firm can choose a high price (collude) or a low aggressive price (defect). The following profit matrix shows the one-period profits arising from these actions. Summit Collude Defect 6 Collude 6 Outreach Defect 9 The following profit matrix shows the one-period profits arising from these actions. These firms compete with each other for five periods